AI toolkit African stock exchange sweep
AI-authored PowerShell toolkit swept African stock exchange for credentials
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Unattributed intruders ran 41 PowerShell modules with hallmarks of AI authorship under a web shell on an unnamed African stock exchange's IIS server on September 20, testing harvested credentials against the exchange's investment API and a securities depository gateway in three minutes, Symantec's Threat Hunter Team reports. They enumerated hosts, processes and SMB connections; scraped web roots, deployment directories, shared folders and SYSVOL for passwords in configuration files, Group Policy cpassword fields and AWS keys; and probed cloud and internal databases. Every module hex-encoded its output, split it into 50-character chunks and sent it as DNS lookups to unique subdomains under one token on oast[.]pro, a loop copied byte for byte into all 41 scripts. Six persistence implants on the same server are attributed with high confidence to the China-linked espionage group Witchetty; the toolkit itself is unattributed, with three possibilities: Witchetty returning with new tooling, a second operator using its access, or an unrelated actor. No privilege escalation or data theft was observed; whether any credential test succeeded is unknown.
Breakdown
Targets
- Industry: Financial services
Technical exposure
- Internet-facing IIS server compromised since at least April 2026
- Plaintext secrets in web roots, deployment folders and SYSVOL
- Investment API and depository gateway reachable from the web server
Adversary
Unattributed toolkit operator; six co-resident implants attributed with high confidence to China-linked Witchetty (LookingFrog)
Procedures (7)
Web shell execution under the IIS worker process
- T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell
Logs
IIS logs and Sysmon Event ID 1 · PowerShell processes spawned by w3wp.exe, indicating script execution under the IIS worker process on a public-facing web server
Host, process and SMB enumeration via WMI
- T1057Process Discovery
- T1033System Owner/User Discovery
- T1135Network Share Discovery
Logs
PowerShell script block logging Event ID 4104 · WMI queries collecting machine name, user identity, mapped drives, SMB connections and full parent-child process command lines
Secret scraping of web roots, deployment folders and SYSVOL
- T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- T1552.006Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 11 · Recursive reads of .xml, .json, .env and web.config files in web roots, C:\Deployer and the SYSVOL share, including Group Policy cpassword fields and AWS access keys
SharePoint, SCCM and TFS repository enumeration
Logs
PowerShell script block logging Event ID 4104 · SharePoint snap-in iteration through sites and document libraries for files containing credential keywords, SCCM AdminService and WMI SMS_R_System queries, and TFS API project listing
Database probing of cloud and internal databases
- T1046Network Service Discovery
Logs
Firewall and network flow logs · Direct TCP connections to an AWS RDS PostgreSQL instance on port 5432 and integrated-authentication queries against a Microsoft SQL Server for system-user and version data
Credential validation against investment API and depository gateway
- T1078Valid Accounts
Logs
Application and API gateway logs · Login attempts with guessed passwords, a reused bearer token, and cycled x-api-key values against authenticated endpoints, including connections by IP with a manual Host header and certificate validation disabled
Hex-chunked DNS exfiltration to oast.pro subdomains
- T1048.003Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Logs
DNS resolver query logs · High volumes of unique subdomains matching the pattern $i.$v.<module>.<token>.oast.pro carrying 50-character hex chunks, including the token danoam334iqjo0ap2scg6ofosjxfgqhsa
Indicators of compromise
Domains (1)
- danoam334iqjo0ap2scg6ofosjxfgqhsa.oast.proExfiltration token on the public out-of-band testing service used by all 41 modules for DNS lookups
Hashes (26)
- 8940de2ada979ad2c53ece0b5cb84100c4df0a024b4b363e96cb6a67469e30d5SHA-256, Mimikatz
- 5c4f6e21877dfd71e3e95254c6193457e9aab10aca7459ddaeb6d711997190deSHA-256, loader
- 982750f4f9edd2ef51b9972a1018a8777bd9d65e0d2e43977a522bdc73ddef5fSHA-256, persistence implant hijacking the Avast wsc_proxy component
- 1363534d205ad60f6700d81f2af2c0ce6d959b73fd405adbb598072395bd26e5SHA-256, persistence implant (ShellcodeLoader)
- 0ad7e39ce6b9b7637a002c352637089f6ccf8ae39206a7d895266b21ca26ff0fSHA-256, RC4-encrypted loader
- 2e223e3c6dc7a130f0281a6c608cd58c153ec026c020c8a661b60a1e285140bfSHA-256, utility that base64-encodes beacon.bin, XORs it with 0x53 and writes Default.xml
- 5a2f093f7ae25c5e381647549496acf375e18dd95263b921518e340ee78e5377SHA-256, DLL loader running only inside svchost, decrypting WindowsUpdate.xml with XOR 0x53
- b1155f47910f032217352c3a302c01de4d15cabda34331d2866f5d7a52b3ecdeSHA-256, similar loader, host process svchost.exe
- b737eae170534f5965b90f4af807cb3f728498f3bccc9355a0afc0171e413230SHA-256, similar loader, host process svchost.exe
- 5fd9a352d1bec4a11134ee140aa278d07d720b45493a7f01a548293f412972ceSHA-256, similar loader, host process svchost.exe
- 242c411cd415d55e67aae75759e5c07720fcdddc0378b5e35d4c1e4ab2b01eb8SHA-256, similar loader, host process svchost.exe
- af3737ba032b8c5d3403064899ab6cc48610a397d9f67b626f99b2f0f5082202SHA-256, similar loader, host process VSPerfCmd.exe
- 6b3061d6e042744bb484b725031e7916b31ad224318a8c04b1b9ead14ab853d5SHA-256, DLL loader decrypting setting.dat with a repeating 16-byte XOR key
- 9b4dadaa55479727f7c0034ff9c07165597b9a9a9376b6e564634eeaf1c6b876SHA-256, DLL loader decrypting setting.dat with a repeating 16-byte XOR key
- d732660db5af253aacbc580d6114d59d233c48b3a5ead6dcfcb55246252abed2SHA-256, DLL loader decrypting setting.dat with a repeating 16-byte XOR key
- 85e75e78a545a2fe11ac19385cc8c0789e1056a2cd4edfec32a6a6b113001e5aSHA-256, loader decoding mfeann.log and injecting it as x64 shellcode
- 1c1704d789332c4d6ce57139d27194ac64c27bfbb1368f1006ffc3c96f3bcb80SHA-256, Nim-compiled DLL impersonating VSPMsg.dll, loader for Msg.log
- 3ca9d65046420592e726776bb26b08719721d108f6947fd22af1d5e7cac33edcSHA-256, Cobalt Strike beacon
- 30dc80cb4c791d80eb21597232fb2f5a4111bf3dfad32c736b789d77127310efSHA-256, Cobalt Strike beacon
- 152c125eacdacc69406b120afd95994eef0f7a0cd638c2d8723e64f79344a336SHA-256, Cobalt Strike beacon
- 8129e103509f00f40a6a2740b76bc3f9449ac09cd9222ba289e52e86f31f616eSHA-256, Cobalt Strike beacon
- 26dc22c99e5e88363818e56dc5883258f048e426c9aa515887bf5d06872782f9SHA-256, file not available for analysis
- 53ddb6c51aca4bd6b00ed83a8019ee1440351f8eeb95a7b6c74a2b75210d85b2SHA-256, file not available for analysis
- af295b5081ccdfd601a0aaecaa81fe1aa92125b548063863dbca2011cef658ceSHA-256, file not available for analysis
- 0f2c40d31887418de304ca182afb4f4fecfe95937068f11fc798778c2ca95e3fSHA-256, mfeann.exe
- 002ce0d28ec990aadbbc89df457189de37d8adaadc9c084b78eb7be9a9820c81SHA-256, vsperfcmd.exe
Sources
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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