ARTEX agentic offensive framework intrusions
ARTEX and other agentic offensive frameworks run fast bursts of cloud and enterprise intrusion steps in real attacks
Posted · Updated · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Multiple actors, including UNC7228 (which overlaps Microsoft's Storm-0940), CrowdStrike's VAPOR PANDA and Storm-3358, are running open-source multi-agent pentesting platforms such as ARTEX, PentAGI and CAIRN in real intrusions, Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant report, with ARTEX execution sequences running in bursts of roughly 2 to 25 seconds (GTIG, A/1). In one case ARTEX pointed MySQL general_log_file at a public .jsp path and wrote JSP web shells through SELECT statements; in another it posted results to 491 rotating webhook.site URLs. It probed AWS permissions with DryRun calls, swept Azure ARM deployments/validate, abused Kudu SCM APIs and ran DCSync after Kerberoasting. VAPOR PANDA hit entities in at least 14 countries from 17 October 2026 and deployed the BLOODALCHEMY backdoor (CrowdStrike, A/2), and Storm-3358 targeted financial organizations with ARTEX (Microsoft, A/2). The MySQL web-shell incident is not attributed.
Breakdown
Countries
- United States
- South Korea
Targets
OrganizationsIndustries
- Organization: WorkOS
- Organization: ConnectWise
- Industry: Government
- Industry: Pharmaceuticals
- Industry: Semiconductors
- Industry: Defense
- Industry: Financial services
- Industry: Telecommunications
- Industry: Think tanks
- Industry: Energy (nuclear)
- Industry: Technology
- Industry: Cryptocurrency
Technical exposure
- SQL-execution APIs reachable with valid app or database credentials
- Cloud control planes (AWS, Azure ARM, Kudu SCM) open to stolen credentials
- Public Cognito user pools allowing self-registration plus an identity pool
- Internet-facing accounts open to spraying; mail-server keys not rotated
- Web apps accepting anonymous file uploads or attacker-controlled server requests
- Internal tool APIs accepting weak or development credentials
- Servers able to reach public request-catcher services such as webhook.site
Adversary
Multiple actors using ARTEX: UNC7228 (overlaps Storm-0940), VAPOR PANDA, Storm-3358 · GTIG, Microsoft, CrowdStrike (A/2)
Procedures (25)
Database query log redirected into a web-executable file
- T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell
Logs
- MySQL Enterprise Audit Db.audit · Query audit record (JSON format): general; status
Linux or Windows EDR file events · File creation: mysqld; ends with .jsp; web-served directory
Workload sends data to a public request-catcher service
- T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
Logs
- EDR process events · Process creation: curl.exe; contains a request-catcher domain (observed: webhook.site); database server or domain controller
- Web proxy / egress gateway Access log · HTTP request: request-catcher service category; cluster node, pod CIDR or instance; POST, non-trivial body
- Route 53 Resolver query logs / Cloud DNS logs · DNS query: request-catcher domain; workload address; DNS shows the lookup, not the upload
Cloud permission probing with DryRun API calls
- T1580Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
Logs
Aws.cloudtrail · Management events: EC2 / EBS / snapshot / security-group API calls
Azure.activity · Administrative operation: Microsoft.Resources/deployments/validate/action
Directory replication requested by an account that is not a domain controller
- T1003.006OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
Logs
Domain controller — Security log · 4662 — operation performed on an object: 0x100; not a domain-controller computer account or approved sync account
- Sensor covering domain-controller RPC traffic · dce_rpc.log call: drsuapi; DRSGetNCChanges; host that is not a domain controller
Password spray across many accounts from one source
- T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying
Logs
Entra ID sign-in logs · Interactive / non-interactive sign-in: 50126 (invalid username or password)
Domain controller / server Security log · 4625 — account failed to log on: 0xC000006D / 0xC000006A
Okta System Log · user.session.start: FAILURE; INVALID_CREDENTIALS
Mailboxes read with a forged administrator token
- T1114.002Email Collection: Remote Email Collection
Logs
Exchange Online mailbox audit (broader case: observed mail platform no · MailItemsAccessed: MailItemsAccessed; 1 (admin) or 2 (delegate)
Web shell written into a web-served directory by the web or application server
- T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell
Logs
- EDR file events · File creation: ends with .jsp, .jspx, .php, .aspx; web root or deployed application directory
- Web server access log · HTTP request (follow-on requests to the written file): script path not seen before this day; POST
Process posing as a Windows system binary loads a DLL from its own folder
- T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
Logs
Sysmon operational log · EID 7 — image loaded: ends with \svchost.exe, path not C:\Windows\System32 or SysWOW64; DLL in the same folder as Image; false or not Microsoft |...
- EDR process and image-load events · Image load: svchost.exe; not C:\Windows\System32 or SysWOW64; DLL in the same folder as the loading process | Process creation: not svchost.exe
Resource-based constrained delegation written to a computer object
- T1098Account Manipulation
Logs
Domain controller — Security log · 5136 — directory object modified: msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity; %%14674 (value added); not a provisioning or admin workflow account |...
LAPS local administrator passwords read from the directory
- T1555Credentials from Password Stores
Logs
Domain controller — Security log · 4662 — operation performed on an object: Audit Success
Commands sent to cloud instances through the cloud administration service
- T1651Cloud Administration Command
Logs
CloudTrail management events · AWS Systems Manager API call: ssm.amazonaws.com; SendCommand (StartSession = session opened only); absent
Azure Activity log · Administrative operation: Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action; Succeeded
Service tickets requested for many user-owned SPNs with weak encryption
- T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Logs
Domain controller — Security log · 4769 — Kerberos service ticket requested: 0x17 (RC4-HMAC); not krbtgt and not ending in $
Backend database bulk-queried for application data
- T1213.006Data from Information Repositories: Databases
Logs
- Database statement audit (e.g. MySQL Enterprise Audit, SQL Server Audi · Statement audit record: SELECT against application tables, including decryption functions; success
Mass reads of cloud storage blobs by one identity
- T1530Data from Cloud Storage
Logs
Azure Storage resource logs (StorageBlobLogs) · Blob data-plane request: GetBlob; SAS or AccountKey
Command-line transfer utility downloads a binary that is then executed
- T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
Logs
- EDR process and network events · Process creation: curl, wget, nc, ncat (observed: netcat and curl) | Process creation (follow-on): same path the transfer utility wrote | Network...
- EDR file events · File creation: curl, wget, nc, ncat; ELF or PE executable, or script
Windows Security log · 4688 — process created: ends with \curl.exe; http(s) URL or IP with -o / -O
Records bulk-retrieved through an application API by one client
- T1213Data from Information Repositories
Logs
- Web server, reverse proxy or API gateway access log · HTTP request
Public software distribution objects overwritten in cloud storage
- T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Logs
CloudTrail S3 data events · S3 object-level API call: s3.amazonaws.com; PutObject (also CopyObject, CompleteMultipartUpload); absent
Cloud log groups searched for credentials and sensitive data
- T1552Unsecured Credentials
Logs
CloudTrail events for CloudWatch Logs · CloudTrail API call: logs.amazonaws.com; FilterLogEvents; 1000 (observed constant across sessions)
Account self-registered on a public cloud user directory by an unknown client
- T1136.003Create Account: Cloud Account
Logs
CloudTrail events for Amazon Cognito user pools · CloudTrail API call: cognito-idp.amazonaws.com; tool-named strings such as Mozilla/5.0 ARTeX (observed), curl
Federated app-user cloud credentials used to enumerate cloud services
- T1526Cloud Service Discovery
Logs
CloudTrail management events · CloudTrail API call: AccessDenied (observed), or success
Public cloud storage bucket probed for hidden objects by an anonymous client
- T1619Cloud Storage Object Discovery
Logs
CloudTrail S3 data events · CloudTrail API call: s3.amazonaws.com; GetObject, ListObjects; anonymous (userIdentity.type AWSAccount)
Credential added to a service principal by an application
- T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Logs
Entra ID audit logs · Directory audit (category ApplicationManagement): populated (InitiatedBy.user empty); success
Directory or cloud role assigned by an application
- T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
Logs
Entra ID audit logs · Directory audit (RoleManagement / ApplicationManagement): Add member to role | Add app role assignment to service principal; populated...
Azure Activity log · Administrative operation: Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write; application (service principal) object or app ID; Succeeded
Application signs in to the cloud identity provider from a scripted client
- T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Logs
Entra ID sign-in logs (interactive and non-interactive) · Sign-in
Entra ID service principal sign-in logs · Service principal sign-in
Agent-generated scripts written to a temp folder and run in rapid bursts
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
Logs
- EDR file events · File creation: temporary directory, particularly C:\Windows\Temp
- EDR process events · Process creation: powershell.exe, cmd.exe, sh, bash
Indicators of compromise
IPs (26)
- 45.153.126.223IP of nginxmysql.com; CrowdStrike
- 89.46.234.50IP of sqlserver-sqlite.com; CrowdStrike
- 192.121.47.20IP of www.ddduuuppp.com; CrowdStrike
- 199.19.95.66WISP C2 node; Microsoft, Storm-3358
- 199.19.95.67WISP C2 node; Microsoft, Storm-3358
- 199.19.95.68WISP C2 node; Microsoft, Storm-3358
- 91.92.240.238ARTEX server; Microsoft, Storm-3358
- 85.11.168.45ARTEX server; Microsoft, Storm-3358
- 85.11.167.52C2 server; Microsoft, Storm-3358
- 178.16.54.129ARTEX server; Microsoft, Storm-3358 (its Sentinel query lists a different third octet)
- 31.77.229.35ARTEX server; Microsoft, Storm-3358
- 154.64.252.77ARTEX agent source IP; WorkOS
- 183.1.65.106ARTEX agent source IP; WorkOS
- 95.169.20.166ARTEX agent source IP; WorkOS
- 203.190.1.60ARTEX agent source IP; WorkOS
- 240e:3b2:1959:e4b0:b282:e2ff:fe48:d1caARTEX agent source IPv6; WorkOS
- 240e:3b2:195a:8b20:b282:e2ff:fe48:d1caARTEX agent source IPv6; WorkOS
- 169.128.55.214ARTEX source IP; Datadog
- 154.36.136.197ARTEX source IP; Datadog
- 154.36.136.23ARTEX source IP; Datadog
- 102.216.154.102ARTEX source IP; Datadog
- 82.158.88.233ARTEX source IP; Datadog
- 88.229.22.232ARTEX source IP; Datadog
- 103.54.154.40ARTEX source IP; Datadog
- 103.54.154.32ARTEX source IP; Datadog
- 45.145.228.25ARTEX source IP; Datadog
Domains (3)
- nginxmysql.comBLOODALCHEMY C2 domain; CrowdStrike
- sqlserver-sqlite.comBLOODALCHEMY C2 domain; CrowdStrike
- www.ddduuuppp.comBLOODALCHEMY C2 domain; CrowdStrike
Hashes (3)
- 49fe70419fd19b81ca8d730a6ef7c1ec71b681d60b390761070d42686c7d2068SHA256 GameHook binary renamed svchost.exe; CrowdStrike
- 3fb5a9fb3e2cb1d6208966bd4e55d10282d19c7250d827efa560463d60a12ee4SHA256 BLOODALCHEMY loader graphics-hook-filter64.dll; CrowdStrike
- 364251838edfcf5ef1107fa692da3c5bd9a540482449f645992830134bf807abSHA256 BLOODALCHEMY payload graphics-hook_config.bin; CrowdStrike
Sources
- A/1Google Threat Intelligence Group: GTIG AI Threat Tracker: From Prompting to Autonomy — The Evolution of Adversarial AI
- A/1Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Microsoft Security Research: Threat actors use agentic AI tooling to find and abuse exposed secrets
- A/1Google Threat Intelligence Group: GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Agentic Threat Activity Crosses a Significant Threshold
- A/2CrowdStrike: Agentic Toolsets Used by Cybercriminals
- A/2Microsoft Threat Intelligence: Storm-0940 uses ARTEX agentic AI in ConnectWise supply chain compromise
- A/2CrowdStrike: CrowdStrike Uncovers New Agentic AI Campaigns
- A/3CrowdStrike: VAPOR PANDA Uses AI-Driven ARTEX to Scale a Global Espionage Campaign
- A/3CrowdStrike: Unknown Threat Actor Uses AI-Driven ARTEX to Target South Korean Finance
- B/1Todyl: Stolen App Credentials, Real Access: An Actor Is Signing Into Entra ID and Azure DevOps as Your Workloads
- C/2ThreatFrontier: Google Finds an AI Agent That Turns Patches Into Exploits, and a Backdoor Planted in Claude Code Settings
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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