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AttackCapture credential-theft operation

Russian-speaking operation steals US bank and federal logins via cracked password vaults

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

A Russian-speaking operator ran a 27-day credential-theft campaign from a Netherlands VPS, compromising 603 Windows hosts with a custom Python implant and stealing decrypted password-manager vaults, US bank and federal identity logins, and session tokens from 35 AI developer products, according to Hunt.io analysis of the operator's exposed directory. The server ran three parallel C2 frameworks, HavoX, Phantom53 and a Kraken bridge, fronted traffic through 12 Cloudflare Workers domains, and left a 1.11 GB open directory of loot, scripts and logs. The tooling cracked LastPass, 1Password and KeePass vaults offline, bypassed Chrome app-bound encryption with hardcoded AES-GCM keys, and replayed stolen ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT cookies to mint Microsoft Graph tokens without a new login or MFA prompt. At least 57 victims held US bank or government logins, at least 46 held federal identity accounts including ID.me and Login.gov, and one LastPass vault alone held 2,880 decrypted logins and 17 passkeys. Persistence survived implant removal through Level.io and ScreenConnect remote management agents, with Level.io dispatch integrated into the Phantom53 C2 as a named alias.

Breakdown

Countries

  • United States

Targets

  • Industry: Opportunistic

Technical exposure

  • Windows hosts where pythonw.exe can run .pyw scripts from AppData
  • Password-manager vaults crackable offline with victim-derived wordlists
  • Chrome v20/v21 app-bound encryption defeatable with hardcoded AES-GCM keys
  • Persistent M365 sessions replayable via stolen ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT cookies
  • AI developer credentials stored in plaintext dot-directories on endpoints

Adversary

Unattributed Russian-speaking operator running the HavoX, Phantom53 and Kraken C2 stack; bridge logs written in Russian

Procedures (6)

  1. Python implant runs windowless as a .pyw script

    • T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

    Logs

    • EDR process events · pythonw.exe launching a .pyw script from AppData\Roaming\[hex]\[hex].pyw; beacon traffic to workers.dev subdomains at 3 to 60 second intervals
  2. Password-manager vaults exfiltrated and cracked offline

    • T1555Credentials from Password Stores
    • T1110.002Brute Force: Password Cracking

    Logs

    • EDR file events · Reads of LastPass extension LevelDB stores, 1Password SQLite vaults and KeePass .kdbx databases followed by uploads to port 8125 on 145.63.138.67 or port 11603 on 66.165.246.77
  3. Browser profiles staged and app-bound encryption bypassed

    • T1555.001Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain

    Logs

    • EDR file events · w_grab.ps1 staging Chrome, Edge and Firefox profiles under %TEMP%\wg and archiving them for upload; cookie filtering across 28 high-value domains
  4. Stolen cookies replayed into Microsoft Graph tokens

    • T1539Steal Web Session Cookie
    • T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token

    Logs

    • Entra ID sign-in logs · Sign-ins with ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT cookie reuse and no MFA prompt; Graph Bearer token issuance for two tenants from one infected host
  5. AI developer credentials harvested from 35 products

    • T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

    Logs

    • EDR file events · prec_ai.ps1, prec_ai2.ps1, prec_ai3.ps1 and ai_grab.ps1 reading ~/.claude/.credentials.json, ~/.codex/auth.json, ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json and ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml
  6. RMM agents deployed for persistence past implant removal

    Logs

    • EDR process and install events · Silent Level.io installer fetched from downloads.level.io, dispatched by the Phantom53 alias rmm1; ScreenConnect session enumeration via x.screenconnect.com API

Indicators of compromise

IPs (4)

  • 145.63.138.67primary C2 and loot server, Podaon SIA AS211381, Netherlands
  • 66.165.246.77secondary exfiltration endpoint on port 11603, Hivelocity AS29802
  • 146.70.24.172external Kraken operator panel
  • 188.137.236.209operator authentication to HavoX recorded in hv.log

Domains (13)

  • sync-node-serv.comKraken task URLs on port 8080 with 30-minute token TTLs
  • 3k7d7v5hn.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • bog1hav1ged3-1jtn.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • busykifukek2-8psk.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • fep0bupuhag2-o0kk.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • fypahedupal2-0maz.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • j1nanyd1jot2-lwml.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • l0mad1fugiv2-7mtj.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • nelol0k0tys3-jbne.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • sekolonozus3-erij.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • tej0kygaj0g3-tad7.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • vajowigus0p3-yw4k.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front
  • zetogebuw1s2-5hzu.workers.devCloudflare Workers C2 front

Sources

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