AuditTeam OpsAgent ransomware
AuditTeam ransomware kills security products with a signed antivirus driver through the OpsAgent framework
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Kaspersky GReAT (B/2) reports that AuditTeam, a ransomware group posing as a security auditor, compromised dozens of organizations across at least seven countries and territories from January to October 2026 using OpsAgent, a previously unknown modular framework that kills security products with a validly signed antivirus driver before encrypting files. The 18 November Securelist report breaks down the implant, which rivals Cobalt Strike in scope: shellcode injection into msiexec.exe over named pipes, mimikatz and pass-the-hash, keylogging, screenshots, and agent-to-agent pivoting over SMB, HTTP and SOCKS. Its command-and-control address is fetched as an encrypted blob from a public GitHub repository README and resolves to CloudFront subdomains, and the group rewrote the implant from C++ to Rust during the campaign. The ransom note demands an Audit and Consulting fee in exchange for a vulnerability report; the initial access vector is not published and no CVE is involved.
Breakdown
Countries
- China
- Philippines
- Senegal
- Italy
- Finland
- Hong Kong
- Russia
- Turkey
- Thailand
- Ukraine
- Argentina
- South Korea
- Japan
- Spain
Technical exposure
- Windows hosts where the OpsAgent loaders and implant can execute
- Ability to load a kernel driver (kvcore.sys carries a valid signature)
- Outbound HTTPS to github.com and CloudFront subdomains from endpoints
- Shadow copies and local backups present on the encrypted host
- Database and backup services running on Windows hosts
Adversary
AuditTeam · OpsAgent campaign attributed to the group by Kaspersky GReAT (B/2)
Procedures (7)
Loaders inject OpsAgent shellcode into msiexec.exe
- T1055Process Injection
- T1055.004Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call
Logs
- EDR process events · Process created: msiexec.exe with no installation arguments OR notepad.exe spawned by an unknown parent; loader uses CreateRemoteThread or NtQueueApcThread into the target; OLLVM-obfuscated loader binaries
Sysmon injection events · Event ID 8 CreateRemoteThread or Event ID 10 ProcessAccess: a loader writing into msiexec.exe or notepad.exe; shellcode arriving over a named pipe and decrypted with XOR key 604902af7b70b271
Detectors
- Kaspersky product detection · HEUR:Backdoor.Win64.OpsAgent.gen
Implant pulls encrypted C2 address from a public GitHub repository
Logs
- Web proxy · HTTPS request: github.com/RonaldCMalcolm1983/staticPage README or raw content from a non-browser process; followed by a TLS WebSocket (wss) session to a cloudfront.net subdomain
- DNS logs · Query sequence: github.com then d19v1tntmz2i98.cloudfront.net or d35htktbyt7nxc.cloudfront.net from the same host within minutes
mimikatz and pass-the-hash run through named pipes
Logs
- EDR process events · Background job in msiexec.exe (default host, changeable): mimikatz_spawn, pth_spawn, execute_assembly, make_token, steal_token or getsystem activity, each preceded by named-pipe shellcode delivery
Agents pivot between compromised hosts over SMB, HTTP and SOCKS
Logs
- EDR network events · Internal connections: agent-to-agent link, connect and http_connect sessions over SMB, HTTP or TCP; SOCKS sessions relaying traffic through compromised hosts
Windows Event Log · Event ID 5145 network share access from a workstation or server running the OpsAgent agent process
Signed Jiangmin antivirus driver kills security and backup products
- T1562.001
Logs
- EDR driver-load events · Driver loaded: kvcore.sys, a validly signed Beijing Jiangmin KV-series driver, into the drivers directory; communication over filter port \KvCorePortX0; C:\Users\Public\kv_dbg.log created
- EDR process events · Process termination burst: MsMpEng, SecurityHealthService, Sysmon64, splunkd, wazuh-agent, VeeamNFSSvc, AcronisAgent, sqlservr and roughly 220 other security, monitoring, remote-access, backup and database processes in a short window
Cryptor stops database and backup services and deletes shadow copies
Logs
- EDR process events · Process created: service stops for SQL Server, Oracle, MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis and Veeam; shadow-copy deletion; mass file encryption with AES-CBC or ChaCha20 keys; recycle-bin and temp-folder wipes; files overwritten with random data before deletion
Windows Event Log · System Event ID 7036: database and backup services entering the stopped state across a host in quick succession
Indicators of compromise
IPs (1)
- 157.20.104.111C2 address posted to the dead-drop GitHub repository; hunt-only
Domains (2)
- d19v1tntmz2i98.cloudfront.netOpsAgent C2 behind CloudFront; added to the GitHub repository in January 2026
- d35htktbyt7nxc.cloudfront.netOpsAgent-rs C2 behind CloudFront; added to the GitHub repository in August 2026
URLs (1)
- https://github.com/RonaldCMalcolm1983/staticPagepublic dead-drop repository holding the encrypted C2 configuration
Hashes (6)
- d3e49dceb89a25f5da4ff0c42e996857MD5 OpsAgent stager
- bd4c327ad208cb722ad25e43ea3f35fcMD5 OpsAgent stager
- 5d1425ab3dad1d2de053f69529d227e1MD5 OpsAgent stager
- f0d5752054f6b7af1325ea340c4326d0MD5 OpsAgent stager
- 83768e994c6bb72d0b430b98a71ec8d6MD5 OpsAgent stager
- 109cdc24ccd4872a3e4bf6f2d4f3c3d4MD5 signed Beijing Jiangmin KV-series driver abused by the EDR killer module
Sources
- B/2Kaspersky Securelist: The forced audit: how AuditTeam's OpsAgent framework masks ransomware as consulting
- B/2Kaspersky: Kaspersky uncovers AuditTeam ransomware campaign spanning Europe, Asia and Africa
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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