BADBOX 3.0 TV box operation
TXCZ-linked backdoored TV boxes generated 40 billion daily ad-fraud bid requests and residential proxy traffic
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Unattributed operators, linked by HUMAN Security's Satori team to the Chinese electronics manufacturer TXCZ, shipped backdoored low-cost TV boxes that generated roughly 40 billion fraudulent advertising bid requests per day at peak and enrolled devices into eleven residential proxy networks without owners' consent, according to HUMAN Security (A/2). The backdoor ships as a system application on uncertified Android Open Source Project devices built in mainland China, checks in at api.drgdj.top, and pulls a module catalog from public code repositories and operator file servers. Ad-fraud modules render ads in invisible windows while issuing bid requests that borrow legitimate connected TV app identities; at peak the operation was more than four percent of connected TV traffic HUMAN observed. Proxy modules enroll devices in eleven residential proxy services including PXYEDGE, successor to IpMoYu, with about 340,000 measured unique connections. Hunting pivots include the drgdj.top and shzhtxcz.com infrastructure, com.google.system module class names, and bid requests from uncertified devices claiming legitimate app identities.
Breakdown
Targets
- Industry: Opportunistic
Technical exposure
- Low-cost uncertified AOSP TV boxes built in mainland China
- Firmware backdoor preinstalled at the factory as a system application
- Home networks without egress filtering of unknown device destinations
Adversary
Unattributed operators linked by HUMAN Satori to Chinese electronics manufacturer TXCZ; PXYEDGE residential proxy network assessed as successor to IpMoYu
Procedures (3)
Factory backdoor checks in and pulls module catalog from code repositories
Logs
- Home router and DNS logs for TV box egress · Uncertified streaming devices contacting api.drgdj.top, file.drgdj.top, gh.drgdj.top or 47.113.90.237:8081
Detectors
- HUMAN Defense Platform detection of BADBOX 3.0 backdoor and module traffic · Satori disruption covered devices observed on the Human Defense Platform
Hidden video-ad modules impersonate legitimate connected TV apps in bid requests
- T1036Masquerading
Logs
Ad exchange and supply-path reporting · Bid requests from uncertified device models claiming legitimate CTV app identities, absent from sellers.json and app-ads.txt, with surges at the same hour daily and residential proxy exit addresses
Detectors
- HUMAN Defense Platform invalid traffic detection for spoofed CTV bid requests · Operation identified through high-volume CTV requests impersonating a legitimate app
Indicators of compromise
IPs (6)
- 47.113.90.237Legacy C2 contacted at port 8081 with /dd/cc path
- 39.108.226.196Module downloader C2 on port 8801 serving encrypted secondary payload
- 47.106.197.183Module downloader C2 on port 8802 serving encrypted secondary payload
- 129.227.67.234PXYEDGE command server, also listed among myic servers
- 128.14.141.107PXYEDGE relay data plane shared with BADBOX infrastructure
- 107.151.239.17PXYEDGE frontend, API and management server
Domains (10)
- drgdj.topParent C2 domain; api.drgdj.top serves module lists and logging, file.drgdj.top hosts payloads, gh.drgdj.top is a self-hosted GitHub proxy
- pxyedge.comPXYEDGE residential proxy storefront registered March 15, 2026, reporting about 200,000 nodes
- shzhtxcz.comTXCZ download domain providing payload and configuration routes
- api.shzhtxcz.comServes hidden-ad configurations at /videoadmin/api/advertisement/getByModel and APK download URLs
- ad3g.comAd-fraud and tasking C2
- moyu88.xyzAd-fraud and tasking C2
- ziyemyu.shopAd-fraud and tasking C2
- api.pixelpioneerss.comModule C2
- bur.thedynamicleap.comModule C2
- adv.speed25.topAd-behavior management server on port 6789 for com.speed.adv samples
URLs (2)
- http://47.113.90.237:8081/dd/ccLegacy module endpoint using /dd/cc nomenclature shared with a TXCZ-branded website
- http://api.shzhtxcz.com/videoadmin/api/advertisement/getByModelHidden-ad configuration endpoint
Sources
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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