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BlackNevas vCenter Host Profile wipe

BlackNevas wiped a VMware estate through vCenter Host Profiles and trusted management interfaces

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team (B/2) reported that the BlackNevas ransomware group destroyed an unnamed organization's entire VMware estate in a ten-day intrusion, wiping four ESXi hosts, every virtual machine, both vCenter Server Appliances and all connected backups without exploiting any hypervisor flaw. The 13 November 2026 Securelist report reconstructs how credentials stolen from non-virtualization systems reached a vCenter Server Appliance over root SSH, with MeshAgent deployed 43 seconds after login and a Ligolo-ng reverse tunnel installed four hours later as a systemd service named vmware-vdma calling api.cloudvflare.com, a typosquat of cloudflare.com. The operators abused vCenter Host Profiles, a configuration-compliance feature, to switch the TSM-SSH service to running across the target ESXi hosts and logged into them directly from the vCenter appliance IP, after destroying backup defenses first to deny any recovery path. Kaspersky published a detection table mapping each stage to vCenter Events, vpxa.log, vobd.log, auth.log and shell.log; BlackNevas, first observed in November 2024 and Trigona-derived, overwrote the first two kilobytes of each virtual disk.

Breakdown

Technical exposure

  • vCenter reachable with credentials stolen from non-virtualization systems
  • Root SSH access open to vCenter Server Appliances
  • ESXi hosts managed through vCenter Host Profiles
  • Backup infrastructure sharing admin access or credentials with production
  • ESXi execInstalledOnly or acceptance-level settings that can be weakened

Adversary

BlackNevas ransomware group (Trigona family, first observed November 2024) · named in ransom notes, Kaspersky GERT (B/2)

Procedures (5)

  1. Root SSH login to vCenter deploys MeshAgent within a minute

    Logs

    • vCenter Server Appliance auth.log · Root SSH login to the VCSA from an address outside the management segment; a short shell session that fetches and runs a MeshAgent installer (Windows service vspbind) within about a minute of authentication, observed 43 seconds after login; the SSH session is never reused
  2. Ligolo-ng tunnel disguised as a VMware systemd service

    • T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service
    • T1572Protocol Tunneling

    Logs

    • VCSA filesystem and audit logs · New or modified systemd unit /etc/systemd/system/vmware-vdma.service with description DNS, time, VM settings sync, ExecStart /opt/vmware/bin/agent and Restart=always, referencing a non-baselined binary under a VMware-like path
    • Proxy and DNS egress logs · Egress from the VCSA to api.cloudvflare.com on port 443, a one-character typosquat of cloudflare.com carrying the Ligolo-ng reverse tunnel
  3. Host Profile remediation switches TSM-SSH on across ESXi hosts

    Logs

    • vCenter Events and vpxa.log · Host Profile remediation changing TSM-SSH from policy-disabled to running outside an approved change window, with the service reaching RUNNING within five minutes; vobd.log corroborates the state change
    • ESXi auth.log and network flow · New SSH session to an ESXi host originating from the vCenter appliance IP within 15 minutes of the Host Profile change, a source most networks treat as fully trusted
  4. Backup defenses disabled and recovery infrastructure encrypted first

    • T1562.001
    • T1489Service Stop
    • T1490Inhibit System Recovery

    Logs

    • Backup server telemetry and Windows Event Log · Antivirus protection disabled on backup systems days before hypervisor detonation, followed by backup services stopping, recovery infrastructure encrypting and administrative access being disrupted
  5. ESXi wipe overwrites virtual disks after a short self-test

    • T1485Data Destruction
    • T1486Data Encrypted for Impact

    Logs

    • ESXi shell.log · SFTP upload or new executable under /tmp followed by chmod and a roughly 16-second self-test run, then execution with /p /vmfs/ /depth 5 /wipe /allsys /detach switches targeting the VMFS root; true-only SSH probe sessions precede the commands
    • vCenter Tasks, hostd.log and vmksummary.log · Many VM power-off or world-kill actions within seconds, the running-VM count falling to zero, and ._wipe marker files appearing across datastores

Indicators of compromise

IPs (4)

  • 45.149.154.135MeshAgent remote-management C2; hunt-only, single-origin incident indicator
  • 91.92.242.121VPS used for initial portal access; hunt-only
  • 31.41.33.212VPS used for initial portal access; hunt-only
  • 188.240.57.94VPS used for initial portal access; hunt-only

Domains (1)

  • api.cloudvflare.comLigolo-ng C2 endpoint, one-character typosquat of cloudflare.com; hunt-only

Hashes (3)

  • 28f8da19ddcdf26e426875c7a834b34a79bc1c33SHA-1 of svhost.exe / lock.exe sample; sample-specific
  • 15dc419b7fbeb50c50820a7cd27997541deafa4fa710f074bb657f0149574bafSHA-256 remote-management agent; sample-specific
  • 5a9b7a0d3f25757aea957713d7e84cabec87597b3474368328a8fd5ed7a12f78SHA-256 installed remote-management agent variant; sample-specific

Sources

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