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Bronze Sandcastle

BRONZE SANDCASTLE: Sandboxie DLL sideloading delivers modified Meterpreter backdoors and ntds.dit shadow-copy theft

Posted · Updated · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

Sophos CTU and SophosLabs (Oct 20, A/3) designate BRONZE SANDCASTLE, a newly identified, assessed China-based espionage cluster whose most distinctive marker is consistent Sandboxie DLL sideloading: legitimate executables (SandboxieWUAU.exe or a renamed Start.exe) load a malicious sbiedll.dll that reads an encrypted config.ini payload and executes it in memory as a modified Meterpreter-style backdoor. Across incidents from August 2025 to August 2026 the group ran network and account enumeration, then created Volume Shadow Copies and copied the Active Directory ntds.dit database.

Breakdown

Adversary

BRONZE SANDCASTLE — newly designated China-based cluster

Procedures (2)

  1. Legitimate executable loads malicious sibling DLL

    DLL sideloading: legitimate executables load malicious sibling DLLs

    Logs

    • Sysmon Event ID 7 image loads · Image/ImageLoaded pairs; sbiedll.dll and sibling DLLs loaded by legit exes

    Detectors

    No known detector

Click to expand remaining (1) procedure
  1. Shadow-copy creation then ntds.dit extraction

    Credential access: Volume Shadow Copy creation then ntds.dit copy

    • T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS

    Logs

    • Windows process-creation events · vssadmin shadow creation; GLOBALROOT ntds.dit copies; net enumeration

    Detectors

    • Shadow Copies Creation via OS Utilities (Sigma b17ea6f7) · vssadmin/wmic/powershell 'shadow'+'create' command lines

Indicators of compromise

Hunt only

(Sophos (https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/bronze-sandcastle-deploys-modified-meterpreter-shells), A/3) — sideloading pairs (legitimate executable + malicious DLL): SandboxieWUAU.exe / Start.exe (renamed Sandboxie) with sbiedll.dll; javaw.exe with jli.dll; Krita.exe with Krita.dll; NvdaHelper.exe with NvdaHelperRemote.dll; Jcef_helper.exe with Libcef.dll; Vmmap.exe with Version.dll; LineAppMgr.exe with msvcp140.dll; bginfo64.exe with snmpapi.dll. Staging archive aez.zip (clean javaw.exe + jli.dll + encrypted config.ini). Payload versions 1.1.5 (C2 dc[.]cathaypacifice[.]com, net[.]dpworldto[.]com) and 1.1.7 (encrypted configs fetched from GitHub repository api[.]github[.]com/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW — main.3ku8inqb.js.map, main.lhxjkkai.js.map, main.y8hnze7q.js.map, README.md, plus .ts files that may be implants). Legitimate-service outreach: file[.]io, gofile[.]io, ably[.]net, ably[.]io. The primary states the full indicator list is available in a SophosLabs GitHub repository (no URL given on the page). Assessed 2026-10-24, hunt-only — the C2 domains and the GitHub repository are perishable operator infrastructure; the durable hunt value is behavioral: the nine sideloading file pairs, the config.ini read-then-execute pattern, and the shadow-copy ntds.dit copy sequence.

Detailed

Sideloading pairs (legitimate file → sideloaded malicious DLL): SandboxieWUAU.exe → sbiedll.dll; Start.exe (renamed Sandboxie) → sbiedll.dll; javaw.exe → jli.dll; Krita.exe → Krita.dll; NvdaHelper.exe → NvdaHelperRemote.dll; Jcef_helper.exe → Libcef.dll; Vmmap.exe → Version.dll; LineAppMgr.exe → msvcp140.dll; bginfo64.exe → snmpapi.dll. Staging archive: aez.zip (clean javaw.exe + jli.dll + encrypted config.ini). Payload versions: 1.1.5 (C2: dc[.]cathaypacifice[.]com, net[.]dpworldto[.]com) and 1.1.7 (GitHub config retrieval: hxxps://api[.]github[.]com/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW — files main.3ku8inqb.js.map, main.lhxjkkai.js.map, main.y8hnze7q.js.map, README.md, plus .ts-extension files that may be implants). Legitimate-service outreach: file[.]io, gofile[.]io, ably[.]net, ably[.]io. Beacon structure: JSON with nested info block — hostname, username, GUID, domain, OS version (e.g. 10.0.19042), internal and public IPs, process listing (PID, name, execution method), working directory, code page, CPU architecture, implant start time, implant type (server/client). Post-exploitation: net commands (network/user enumeration), vssadmin.exe shadow-copy creation, ntds.dit copy. Loader internals per the primary: position-independent PE loader and execution stub (reflective loader), flattened control-flow dispatcher (virtualized state machine). The primary states the full IOC list is in a SophosLabs GitHub repository (no URL given on the page). Campaign window: incidents August 2025 through August 2026. All from the primary (Sophos (https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/bronze-sandcastle-deploys-modified-meterpreter-shells), A/3).

Sources

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