Cairn AI pentest framework intrusions
China-nexus CL-STA-1238 runs the Cairn AI pentest framework against semiconductor and defense targets; Cairn agents also took over a Spring Batch server
Posted · Updated · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
China-nexus actor CL-STA-1238 used Cairn, an open-source AI penetration-testing framework driven by Zhipu GLM and DeepSeek models, to autonomously run 25 operations from August to September 2026 against at least 19 semiconductor, defense-policy and civil-society organizations, with unauthorized access or data retrieval at 10 (Unit 42, B/2). Outcomes include password spraying that yielded dozens of valid credentials, an anonymous cloud-storage write that overwrote a standards-ballot document, rogue administrator accounts and a persistent API token at a semiconductor company, and a CMS account-creation bypass that exposed over one million member records. Separately ReliaQuest (B/3) investigated an unattributed intrusion where hundreds of adaptive commands abused an unauthenticated Spring Batch job feature, Nashorn JavaScript, SQL Server xp_cmdshell, then PrintSpoofer or GodPotato for SYSTEM.
Breakdown
Countries
- United States
- Canada
Targets
- Industry: Semiconductors
- Industry: Manufacturing
- Industry: Defense
- Industry: Think tanks
- Industry: Non-profit
- Industry: Education
Technical exposure
- Internet-facing Spring Batch or Tomcat job endpoint without authentication
- Weak or default credentials on web apps, CMS and identity platforms
- CMS unauthenticated account-creation bypass
- Cloud object storage allowing anonymous writes
- SQL Server xp_cmdshell enableable with application-held credentials
Adversary
CL-STA-1238 (Cairn framework) · Unit 42: China-nexus, moderate confidence; ReliaQuest case unattributed (B/3)
Procedures (12)
Script engine code run through an unauthenticated job endpoint
- T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
Logs
- Tomcat / reverse-proxy access log · HTTP request: - (no authenticated user)
Java application server spawns a command shell
- T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
Logs
- EDR process events · Process creation: java / tomcat (application server JVM); /bin/sh, bash, cmd.exe, powershell.exe
Windows Security event log · 4688 — a new process has been created: cmd.exe or powershell.exe; java.exe / tomcat*.exe
Database server OS command execution enabled
- T1505.001Server Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures
Logs
- Microsoft SQL Server audit / error log · Configuration change: sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1 then RECONFIGURE
- EDR process events · Process creation: sqlservr.exe; cmd.exe
Service account escalates to SYSTEM by token impersonation
- T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft
Logs
- EDR process events · Process creation: NT SERVICE\MSSQLSERVER, IIS APPPOOL\*, or another service account; NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM; cmd.exe / powershell.exe under...
Windows Security event log · 4688 — a new process has been created: service account; SYSTEM
Registry credential hives saved to file
- T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager
Logs
- EDR process events · Process creation: reg.exe; save HKLM\SAM | HKLM\SYSTEM | HKLM\SECURITY
Windows Security event log · 4688 — a new process has been created: reg.exe save HKLM\SAM / SYSTEM / SECURITY
Local administrator account created on a server
- T1136.001Create Account: Local Account
Logs
Windows Security event log · 4720 — user account created; 4732 — member added to a security-enabled local group: 4720 then 4732; S-1-5-32-544 (Administrators)
- EDR process events · Process creation: net user <name> <pw> /add ; net localgroup administrators <name> /add
Password spray against an internet-facing application
- T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying
Logs
- Web server / reverse-proxy access log · HTTP request: POST to the application's login path
Okta System Log · user.session.start: FAILURE; INVALID_CREDENTIALS
Entra ID sign-in logs · Sign-in: 50126
Administrator account created in a production application
- T1136Create Account
Logs
- Application / SaaS audit log · User created; role assigned: user created, then admin or owner role granted
Okta System Log · user.lifecycle.create; user.account.privilege.grant: user.lifecycle.create then user.account.privilege.grant
Long-lived API token issued in an application
- T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Logs
- Application / SaaS audit log · API token / key created: API token, key or personal access token created; none or long-lived
Okta System Log · system.api_token.create: system.api_token.create
Account created through an unauthenticated registration path
- T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
Logs
- Web server / reverse-proxy access log · HTTP request: - (no authenticated user); 200 / 201
- Application / CMS audit log · User created: user created; anonymous or the new account itself
Stored file overwritten through anonymous cloud-storage write
- T1565.001Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation
Logs
AWS CloudTrail S3 data events · PutObject: PutObject; anonymous
Azure Storage blob logs · Write: PutBlob / PutBlockList; Anonymous
Bulk record enumeration through an application API
- T1213Data from Information Repositories
Logs
- Web server / reverse-proxy access log · HTTP request: record or user API path with an incrementing object ID
Indicators of compromise
IPs (5)
- 204.194.55.189attack-origin host exposing Cairn and exploitation material
- 204.194.54.240pre-incident scanning and tool-staging host
- 94.177.131.113bulk job-output collection host
- 154.44.31.4CL-STA-1238 Cairn hosting server, Unit 42
- 82.29.129.54CL-STA-1238 staging server and attack egress, Unit 42
Sources
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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