Threat feed

COLD RELIC cloud impersonation chain

COLD RELIC weaponizes stolen cloud data to impersonate staff and breach follow-on organizations

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

Google Threat Intelligence and Mandiant disclosed that Russian FSB-linked espionage group COLD RELIC used identities stolen in a late-2025 Google Workspace compromise to impersonate a victim employee over an encrypted messaging app and breach a second United States organization in 2026 (grade A/1). The first intrusion used stolen Super Admin credentials, a nearby residential proxy and an MFA push-fatigue attack; the group then enrolled passkeys, backup codes and rogue MFA devices that survived password resets, mass-downloaded the cloud drive and staff list via a domain-wide Customer Takeout, and deleted Alert Center notifications. At the second organization, phishing links shared mid-conversation harvested Microsoft Entra ID credentials and tokens; the group then registered a new MFA device and bulk-downloaded the user's cloud drive. New COLD RELIC phishing operations were observed as recently as November 2026, and the group renames its messaging persona after each compromise. Defenders should alert on MFA fatigue patterns, unexpected passkey and device enrollments, Customer Takeout exports, external mass-sharing, alert deletions and audit-log queries.

Breakdown

Countries

  • United States

Technical exposure

  • Cloud productivity tenants using push-notification MFA and federated SSO
  • Passkeys, backup codes and rogue MFA devices survive password resets
  • Staff directories and email archives enable convincing impersonation

Adversary

COLD RELIC (aka COLDRIVER, Star Blizzard, Callisto, UNC4057) · Google Threat Intelligence/Mandiant (grade A/1)

Procedures (5)

  1. Stolen Super Admin credentials and MFA push fatigue over a residential proxy

    • T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
    • T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

    Logs

    • Google Workspace User logs · Repeated MFA challenges followed by successful authentication, login challenges from residential-proxy ASNs such as AS5650 and AS20115 geolocated near the victim

    Detectors

    • GWS Successful MFA Fatigue Attack · Repeated failed MFA challenges for one user in a short window followed by success from the same IPNot built-in
  2. Rogue passkey, backup code and MFA device enrollment for persistence

    • T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration

    Logs

    • Google Workspace User logs · Passkey enrolled and Device Registered events from new device models, and authentications using Login Challenge Type Backup code from non-corporate ASNs
  3. Bulk cloud exfiltration via mass-sharing and domain-wide Customer Takeout

    • T1530Data from Cloud Storage
    • T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

    Logs

    • Google Workspace Drive and Admin logs · CUSTOMER_TAKEOUT_CREATED events, User List Download events, download spikes from one user, and visibility changed to shared_externally with freemail addresses

    Detectors

    • GWS Customer Takeout Initiated · Tenant-wide export creation by any userNot built-in
    • GWS Drive Bulk External or Freemail File Sharing · Spikes in documents shared externally or with freemail providersNot built-in
    • GWS Directory User List Download · Domain user list exports, especially from unknown devicesNot built-in
  4. Alert deletion and audit-log queries for counter-forensics

    • T1562.008
    • T1087.004Account Discovery: Cloud Account

    Logs

    • Google Workspace Admin logs · Batch Delete Operation Performed on alerts including government-backed attack alerts, and Investigation Query events searching security and audit logs

    Detectors

    • GWS Alert Center Alert Deletion · Users modifying or deleting security alerts, especially alerts about their own accountNot built-in
  5. Encrypted-messaging impersonation phishing to steal Entra ID tokens

    • T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link
    • T1528Steal Application Access Token

    Logs

    • Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs · Unfamiliar device registrations and new MFA device enrollment after token theft; phishing URLs on compromised sites carrying victim-name query parameters

Sources

Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).

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