Threat feed

EggStreme passive backdoor retooling

Suspected Chinese APT rebuilt the EggStreme backdoor into a passive listener that never beacons

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

Bitdefender (B/2) reported with high confidence that a suspected Chinese APT group kept attacking Philippine government organizations with a rebuilt EggStreme backdoor whose newest builds never beacon out, opening a listening port instead and waiting for the operator to connect. The 18 November 2026 follow-up to its September 2025 exposure describes agents compiled as fast as 12 days after that report, swapping gRPC for raw TCP over mutual TLS with embedded certificates, dropping the keylogger, expanding commands to 88, and moving toward campaign-specific certificate authorities. Two passive builds listen on TCP port 5060 behind a firewall allow rule named Core Networking - SIP created through the COM firewall API, defeating detections that wait for outbound beacons. Constant behaviors remain DLL sideloading of system-named loaders, staging on file shares reachable from unmanaged hosts, in-memory PowerShell and reflective PE execution without starting powershell.exe, and mutual TLS, each with hunt guidance in the report.

Breakdown

Countries

  • Philippines

Targets

  • Industry: Government

Technical exposure

  • Windows estates with unmanaged hosts reachable over SMB shares
  • Endpoints allowing programmatic inbound firewall rule creation
  • Detection pipelines that rely on outbound C2 beaconing
  • Workstations where script hosts run files from Users Public

Adversary

Suspected Chinese APT group (EggStreme operators, no new attribution claim) · Bitdefender (B/2)

Procedures (5)

  1. Sideloaded system-named DLL decrypts and launches the framework

    • T1574.002
    • T1027Obfuscated Files or Information

    Logs

    • EDR module-load events · advapi32.dll, dbghelp.dll, dwmapi.dll, iscsiexe.dll, DevicesPlatform.dll or xwizards.dll loaded from outside system directories, performing RC5-32 or custom CBC key scheduling with PKCS#7 padding removal; collect the sideloaded DLL together with any payload file found beside it
  2. Payloads hide under Windows file names in user-writable paths

    • T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

    Logs

    • EDR file events · Non-Windows processes reading or writing wpndatabase.dat under Notifications, Alarm00.wav under Media, appmain.sdb and expmain.sdb under apppatch, systemZones.res under ICU, Feeds.tmp, or msinfo32.dll under Common Files; the systemZones.res path alone was reused with five distinct payload hashes
  3. SMB-launched script stages the package and sets an OneDrive-named run key

    • T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
    • T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

    Logs

    • Sysmon and Windows Event Log · WScript.exe or cmd.exe running prncnfg.vbs or Officelog.bat from C:\Users\Public on multiple machines in one network, copying a Fuel package over SMB; run value StandaloneUpdater under HKCU Run pointing to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\OneDrive\setup\logs\StandaloneUpdater.exe, an imitation of the genuine OneDrive updater path two folders deeper
  4. Agent hosts PowerShell and .NET code without starting powershell.exe

    • T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • T1620Reflective Code Loading

    Logs

    • EDR module-load telemetry and PowerShell script-block logging · CLR modules clr.dll and System.Management.Automation loading inside processes that are not .NET hosts; script-block logging captures hosted runspaces; commands 83 to 88 load embedded .NET assemblies, run in-memory PowerShell, and reflectively execute staged PE payloads through an export named werfault, while commands 24 to 26 enumerate domain users, groups and servers
  5. Passive agent opens TCP 5060 behind a Core Networking SIP firewall rule

    • T1571Non-Standard Port
    • T1562.004

    Logs

    • Host firewall events and network telemetry · New inbound allow rule named Core Networking - SIP created through the COM firewall API for domain, private and public profiles with edge traversal; a listener on TCP port 5060 on hosts that are not VoIP endpoints; the handshake expects 32 bytes whose RC4-decrypted first half matches the second

Indicators of compromise

IPs (5)

  • 45.115.225.73newer Fuel C2 infrastructure; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • 109.248.24.84newer Fuel C2 infrastructure; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • 149.104.109.230newer Fuel C2 infrastructure; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • 45.221.112.129development host observed February 2026; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • 221.128.249.228development host observed June 2026; hunt-only, may have been reassigned

Domains (10)

  • mepintei.comlinks Fuel activity with loader and agent infrastructure; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • fsstore.orgexample agent C2 domain, port 443; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • readyui.netoriginal-infrastructure domain seen with newer agent builds; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • hostkbc.comoriginal-infrastructure domain seen with newer agent builds; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • osaweb.orgstaged domain in active use at report time; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • rodosdeals.comserved certificate from development host, later hardcoded as C2; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • eusurvey.orgserved certificate from same development host; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • precontact.orgstaged-domain set observed around June 2026; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • siliconmetal.netstaged-domain set observed around June 2026; hunt-only, may have been reassigned
  • dalkeys.comstaged-domain set observed around June 2026; hunt-only, may have been reassigned

Hashes (15)

  • a363c1529033fb6017985ce07ab0ad57MD5 iscsiexe.dll loader, 2024-05-15, RC4 key google; hunt-only
  • 5e21c73c6e055b67ce1d3311092e09f1MD5 DevicesPlatform.dll loader, 2025-06-09, RC4 key Windows; hunt-only
  • b89966529371bd7585c83267ea6d17d6MD5 xwizards.dll loader, 2025-07-09, RC4 key svchost; hunt-only
  • 0f2404810a20ad1c265a94cf7643e38fMD5 advapi32.dll loader, 2025-10-13, first RC5-32 CBC newer format; hunt-only
  • 2848d5f1a827b70827e4e17497e33946MD5 advapi32.dll loader, 2025-10-28, custom CBC variant A; hunt-only
  • fac380128a04ffc5b8f175071622e885MD5 advapi32.dll loader, 2025-10-28, custom CBC variant A; hunt-only
  • 6f920aa7d2e48d1c2a201eb119ba20f1MD5 advapi32.dll loader, 2025-10-28, custom CBC variant A; hunt-only
  • 467566ff6573d84b927baf37acf11047MD5 dbghelp.dll loader, 2025-11-05, custom CBC newer format; hunt-only
  • 197be742fc81bbc87e5f66d1a4a9af92MD5 dwmapi.dll loader, 2025-11-11, RC4 host-bound key; hunt-only
  • a1da36e1225a3d08ae647980250f43d0MD5 advapi32.dll loader, 2025-12-16, custom CBC newer format; hunt-only
  • cd030f106eada108715e99a4661f7fd4MD5 advapi32.dll loader, 2026-05-14, custom CBC with debug strings; hunt-only
  • 8ad958676e67ff70d1b2b95851de6d5dMD5 EggStremeFuel config masquerading as wpndatabase.dat under Notifications; hunt-only
  • 8b88eb038251be49b1ae78406d817610MD5 payload hidden as Alarm00.wav under SystemRoot Media; hunt-only
  • cbd2d377a041a31bdf94ff95bf37d352MD5 payload hidden as msinfo32.dll under Common Files msinfo; hunt-only
  • 4cfb49f749b75941f1cff59b7cf92e53MD5 payload hidden as expmain.sdb under apppatch; hunt-only

Sources

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