Threat feed

FaceStealer fake Zoom/Teams lure

North Korean Sapphire Sleet runs fake Zoom and Teams calls with stolen webcam clips to deploy NukeSped and macOS stealers

Posted · Updated · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

North Korean state actors the FBI tracks as Sapphire Sleet, BlueNoroff and APT38 take over earlier victims' Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack or Discord accounts and invite contacts to fake Zoom or Teams calls on typo-squatted domains that play recorded webcam video of people the target knows (FBI, A/1). A fake audio or SDK-update problem then talks the target into running a script, opening a .scpt file or pasting a command into a terminal or the Windows Run dialog. On Windows a PowerShell loader adds a Defender exclusion and runs a NukeSped VBScript implant; on macOS curl-to-osascript stages deploy backdoors, a fake password prompt, keychain and TCC tampering, launch daemon or agent persistence and bulk theft of wallet, browser and Telegram data over the Telegram Bot API. The FBI says the scheme stole more than $400 million in 18 months, attempted to push malicious dependencies through a hijacked JavaScript maintainer, and seized 900+ victim webcam videos on 12 November 2026.

Breakdown

Targets

  • Industry: Cryptocurrency and Web3
  • Industry: Software development

Technical exposure

  • Windows and macOS endpoints allowing pasted commands (Run dialog, Terminal)
  • AppleScript .scpt files that open in Script Editor and run curl-fetched code
  • Meeting links accepted from Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack or Discord contacts

Adversary

Sapphire Sleet (aka BlueNoroff, APT38, UNC1069, Stardust Chollima) · FBI FLASH AC-111226-MS (A/1)

Procedures (13)

  1. Meeting link opens a lookalike video-meeting domain

    • T1566.003Phishing: Spearphishing via Service

    Logs

    • DNS query logs · DNS query: workstation
    • Web proxy / SWG · HTTP/HTTPS request: browser user agent
  2. User pastes a command that downloads and runs a script

    • T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste

    Logs

    • EDR process creation · Process creation: explorer.exe (Run dialog), Terminal, zsh or bash; powershell.exe, curl, sh/bash/zsh or osascript
    • PowerShell Operational · Event ID 4104 (Script Block Logging)
  3. AppleScript lure file runs curl-fetched AppleScript

    • T1059.002Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript

    Logs

    • EDR process creation · Process creation: Script Editor or osascript; curl, osascript, sh or zsh
  4. wscript runs a VBScript dropped in Temp

    • T1059.005Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

    Logs

    • EDR process creation · Process creation: powershell.exe; wscript.exe; *.vbs under %TEMP% followed by a numeric argument
    • Sysmon Operational · Event ID 1 (Process Create): \powershell.exe; \wscript.exe; \AppData\Local\Temp\*.vbs
  5. PowerShell loader adds a Defender exclusion and restarts Defender

    • T1562.001

    Logs

    • EDR process creation · Process creation: powershell.exe; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath / -ExclusionExtension; explorer.exe or powershell.exe
    • Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational · Event ID 5007 (configuration changed): HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\*
  6. Fake password prompt validates the captured password

    • T1056.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture

    Logs

    • EDR process creation · Process creation: dscl; -authonly; app bundle or script outside /System (e.g. systemupdate.app)
  7. Keychain secret read with the security CLI

    • T1555.001Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain

    Logs

    • EDR process creation · Process creation: security; unsigned binary, curl-launched payload, sh or osascript
  8. TCC database copied and rewritten to grant automation

    • T1548.006Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: TCC Manipulation

    Logs

    • EDR process creation · Process creation: sqlite3; TCC.db with INSERT into access and kTCCServiceAppleEvents
    • EDR file events · File rename / create / modify: Finder, osascript, cp or sqlite3
  9. Launch daemon plist written by a script-launched process

    • T1543.004Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon

    Logs

    • EDR file events · File create: /Library/LaunchDaemons/*.plist; com.google.* or com.apple.* name; zsh -i, sh, cp, osascript or unsigned binary
  10. Launch agent plist written by a script-launched process

    • T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent

    Logs

    • EDR file events · File create: ~/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist; com.apple.* name in a user LaunchAgents folder; osascript, sh, curl-launched or unsigned binary
  11. Wallet and messaging session data zipped in /tmp

    • T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

    Logs

    • EDR process creation · Process creation: zip or ditto; osascript or sh | Process creation: curl; nohup curl with -F/-T/--data-binary and a /tmp/*.zip file
  12. Non-messaging process connects to the Telegram bot API

    • T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service

    Logs

    • EDR network events · Outbound connection / DNS: api.telegram.org; curl, osascript, unsigned binary — not Telegram or a browser
    • Web proxy / SWG · HTTPS connection (CONNECT / SNI): api.telegram.org; endpoint with no Telegram client in use
  13. Maintainer account pushes to a package repository from a new session

    • T1195.001Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools

    Logs

    • GitHub organization / enterprise audit log · git.push: maintainer account; repository of a published package; IP, client or token type not seen for this maintainer before |...

Indicators of compromise

IPs (4)

  • 144.172.110.53kit VPS, JUMPSEC
  • 172.86.91.195domain rotation server, JUMPSEC
  • 45.61.163.100Zoom lure host, JUMPSEC
  • 83.136.208.246com.apple.cli C2, Microsoft; TCP 6783

Domains (11)

  • uu01webzoom.usfake Zoom meeting domain, FBI
  • teams.livemeet.usfake Teams meeting domain, FBI
  • us.zoom.06webin.usZoom lure, JUMPSEC
  • zoom.05ukweb.ukZoom lure / PowerShell variant A, JUMPSEC
  • weekly-up.onlinepayload host, JUMPSEC
  • callsdk.onlineVBScript C2, JUMPSEC
  • webapp.zoom.05live.coZoom lure, JUMPSEC
  • microteam.liveTeams lure, JUMPSEC
  • lives.teamicrosoft.sbsTeams lure, JUMPSEC
  • cloud.inteam.liveTeams lure, JUMPSEC
  • googie.us-gmeet.comGoogle Meet lure string, JUMPSEC

Hashes (1)

  • b149e207a3aad68605785710c58e8439aef61f48776c136d5a0ec6682d7dd2c0ZoomSDK.bin / winapp.bin macOS dropper, JUMPSEC

Sources

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