Threat feed

GoodGuys expert-interview AiTM phishing

Unattributed GoodGuys operators steal work Google and Okta accounts via fake paid-interview pages and relayed MFA

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

An unattributed phishing operation tracked as GoodGuys is blamed by Push Security (B/2) for a live campaign that steals work Google and Okta account logins from employees through fake paid-interview invitations and real-time relayed MFA prompts. Push Security published the teardown on November 20, 2026; first captures were on October 13, 2026, landing hosts moved from AWS to Vultr on November 13, and a new backend hypernovaguys.com appeared on November 17. Lures impersonate Accenture, Nvidia, Google Cloud, SpaceX, American Express, Coca-Cola, Spotify and Culver's with offers of 500 to 600 dollars, delivered from a genuine HireVue sender address and abused SendGrid, Mandrill and Cvent click trackers, so sender authentication passes. The fake sign-in rejects personal addresses and an operator drives each MFA stage, including SMS codes, authenticator codes, Google tap prompts and Okta Verify pushes; Coca-Cola lures separately chain to a modified Evilginx 3 proxy aimed at Google Ads accounts. The material uncertainty is that captured pages targeted Google accounts, while the Okta screens exist only in kit code and no completed Okta compromise is confirmed.

Breakdown

Targets

  • Industry: Opportunistic

Technical exposure

  • Work Google or Okta account whose MFA can be relayed by an operator
  • Email trust in legitimate senders and click trackers that pass DMARC
  • No phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 keys on targeted accounts

Adversary

Unattributed (kit tracked as GoodGuys) · Push Security (B/2)

Procedures (5)

  1. Paid expert-interview lures arrive from legitimate hiring and mailing services

    Logs

    • Email gateway message and URL logs · Inbound mail from interviews@hirevue.com or click URLs on ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click, mandrillapp.com/track/click, planned.com/ls/click and na.eventscloud.com/emarketing/go.php; SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass because the sending services are legitimate, so pivot on the click-through destination domains and a paid-interview or feedback-study subject rather than sender reputation
  2. Captcha-gated brand page harvests work Google credentials into attacker backend

    • T1056.003Input Capture: Web Portal Capture

    Logs

    • NGFW/proxy HTTP events · GET to brand-prefixed interview lure domains such as accenture.interviewprograms.com, amex.sso-expertinterviews.com or cocacola-company.insightparticipation.com behind a captcha gate, followed by POST to /backend/api/submit.php carrying an X-Session-ID header of 13 to 15 base-36 characters and socket.io register events with role client, sent to importantfuture.com or hypernovaguys.com
  3. Operator relays Google MFA prompts and replays the sign-in from attacker hosts

    • T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle

    Logs

    • Google Workspace Login Audit (Admin API reports) · Login events with eventName suspicious_login, user_signed_out_due_to_suspicious_session_cookie or account_disabled_hijacked for a user whose mailbox shows a lure click; first sign-in from a new country or ASN (Vultr or AWS egress) after the user passed SMS code, authenticator code and tap-prompt stages relayed by the operator

    Detectors

    • Suspicious Login Activity Classified By Google · gcp_gworkspace_suspicious_loginNot built-in
  4. Kit Okta screens capture usernames, passwords and Okta Verify pushes

    • T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle

    Logs

    • Okta System Log · user.authentication.auth_via_mfa or user.session.start for a user with no prior relationship to the lure sender, from a new IP or ASN, an Okta Verify push the user did not initiate (the okta_push command offers send-push-automatically), or an Okta session later used from a second IP or non-browser user agent after initial authentication

    Detectors

    • Okta AiTM Session Cookie Replay · Okta AiTM Session Cookie ReplayNot built-in
  5. Coca-Cola lures chain to an Evilginx 3 proxy stealing Google Ads sessions

    • T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle
    • T1539Steal Web Session Cookie

    Logs

    • Google Workspace Login Audit (Admin API reports) · Login or session events for Google Ads operator accounts from datacenter ASNs after the user passed gates on cocacolainterview.com or adsbillinghub.com; correlate with proxy logs showing accounts.google.com flows proxied from login.cocacolainterview.com or login.adsbillinghub.com subdomains

Indicators of compromise

IPs (3)

  • 162.0.225.230importantfuture.com backend receiving credentials, Oct 13 to Nov 18, Push Security, hunt-only
  • 104.207.85.90hypernovaguys.com backend for Nvidia and Google Cloud builds from Nov 17, Push Security, hunt-only
  • 165.232.88.9Evilginx 3 gate behind Coca-Cola lures, Push Security, hunt-only

Domains (5)

  • importantfuture.comGoodGuys backend receiving credentials from every build, Oct 13 to Nov 18, Push Security
  • hypernovaguys.comGoodGuys backend for Nvidia and Google Cloud builds from Nov 17, Push Security
  • accenture.interviewprograms.comAWS EC2 landing page, Oct 13 to Nov 13, Push Security
  • cocacolainterview.comEvilginx 3 gate with login subdomains for Google and Okta proxies, Push Security
  • adsbillinghub.comEvilginx 3 host with org-okta login subdomains, Push Security

URLs (1)

  • https://importantfuture.com/backend/api/submit.phpcredential submission endpoint receiving X-Session-ID POSTs from every build, Push Security

Sources

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