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Gootloader SEO poisoning legal firms

Gootloader poisoned legal searches to plant ransomware precursors across Windows networks

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

The unattributed Gootloader administrator ran a search-engine-poisoning network of more than 1,000 compromised WordPress sites that fed United States legal professionals malicious JavaScript downloads and opened paths to ransomware, with over 28 million dollars in payments tied to the operation (FBI, A/1). An FBI FLASH published November 16 says the administrator targeted low-competition legal search phrases such as jurisdiction-specific contract clauses, used hidden keyword links and backlinks to rank lure pages, and filtered delivery by country, referrer, cookie and IP through a traffic distribution system; a Justice Department operation removed the malware from more than 100 servers on November 12. On endpoints the chain runs from Windows Script Host execution of a ZIP-delivered script through encoded PowerShell with Invoke-Expression and Assembly.Load, AMSI patching, process hollowing, a mock trusted-directory UAC bypass with DLL side-loading beside a copied easinvoker.exe, Kerberoasting and SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hive dumps, then WinRM, WMI and SMB movement with stolen credentials and remote services deleted after use, with a reverse proxy C2 and uploads to bashupload.com.

Breakdown

Countries

  • United States

Targets

  • Industry: Legal services

Technical exposure

  • Windows Script Host enabled for all users
  • No WDAC or AppLocker control on user-writable script execution
  • Internet-exposed WordPress with xmlrpc.php enabled
  • Unmonitored outbound uploads to public file-sharing services

Adversary

Gootloader administrator (unattributed) · supplies initial access to ransomware operators

Procedures (8)

  1. Search result leads to a JavaScript download run by Windows Script Host

    Logs

    • Proxy and DNS logs · browser downloads of ZIP archives from unfamiliar WordPress sites reached through searches for jurisdiction-specific contract clauses or other low-competition legal terms
    • Sysmon process creation (Event 1) · wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a JavaScript file from a user-writable path such as Downloads, for an archive the user just extracted
  2. Encoded PowerShell reconstructs a payload and loads it in memory

    • T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • T1620Reflective Code Loading

    Logs

    • PowerShell operational logs (Events 4103, 4104) · script blocks containing Invoke-Expression, Assembly.Load, base64 or deflate-decoded payloads reconstructed at runtime, or remote command download
  3. AMSI patched and code injected into another process

    • T1562.001
    • T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing

    Logs

    • Sysmon events (8, 10) · CreateRemoteThread or remote-thread injection into a suspended process image, and process-access patterns consistent with hollowing
    • EDR memory and API telemetry · AmsiScanBuffer patching in memory before script execution
  4. Mock trusted directory bypasses UAC with DLL side-loading

    • T1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
    • T1574.002

    Logs

    • Sysmon process, file and image-load events (1, 7, 11) · a copy of easinvoker.exe in a mock C:\Windows path with a trailing space, a DLL written next to it, and side-loading of that DLL by the auto-elevated executable
  5. Kerberoasting and registry hive dumps harvest credentials

    • T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
    • T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager
    • T1003.004OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets

    Logs

    • Windows Security event log · Kerberos service-ticket requests (Event 4769) with $krb5tgs$-format encrypted timestamps for SPN discovery, plus reg save of HKLM\SAM and SYSTEM and export of the SECURITY hive
  6. Stolen credentials drive WinRM, WMI and SMB movement

    • T1021.006Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
    • T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
    • T1047Windows Management Instrumentation

    Logs

    • Windows Security event log · network logons (Event 4624 type 3), explicit-credential use (4648) and admin-share access (5140, 5145) to C$ staging, correlated with Invoke-Command over TCP 5985 and NTLM-hash SMB authentication
    • WMI-Activity operational log (Events 5857-5861) · remote WMI process creation and access testing from one host across many discovered computers
  7. Remote services created for execution then deleted

    Logs

    • Windows System event log (Event 7045) · transient remote-service installations shortly followed by service deletion, alongside removal of temporary scripts and UAC artifacts
  8. Reverse-multiplexed proxy C2 with uploads to a file-sharing service

    • T1090.001Proxy: Internal Proxy
    • T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

    Logs

    • Proxy, firewall and DNS logs · periodic HTTP/HTTPS GET and POST tasking on custom RC4-like or XOR channels, and outbound uploads to bashupload.com as an alternate transfer path

Indicators of compromise

Domains (1)

  • bashupload.comalternate upload destination named in FBI FLASH CC-111626-MW; not attributed as a Gootloader-specific IOC, hunt-only (FBI)

Sources

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