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Kimsuky NodeLinkRAT note-service C2

Kimsuky NodeLinkRAT swaps payloads through public note-service C2

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

The North Korea-linked espionage group Kimsuky, attributed with moderate confidence by Genians, ran a reply-based spearphishing operation against South Korean policy professionals that stole documents in near real time and installed a new Node.js-based remote access tool, per Genians (B/3). The significant new report is Genians Security Center's November 16, 2026 analysis of the NodeLinkRAT campaign. A lure impersonating a National Assembly aide's honorarium payment form delivers an LNK file disguised as a Hangul document; character-substitution-obfuscated PowerShell downloads a polymorphic loader that registers the scheduled task CommonMaintenanceHost, running every 38 minutes. The loader periodically reads a public anotepad.com note page, extracts Base64 code between marker strings, and executes it in memory, letting the actor hot-swap payloads from XenoRAT to Dropbox and MEGA exfiltration scripts and finally NodeLinkRAT, which installs the official Node.js runtime into C:\Users\Public\Music and beacons over Socket.IO with a hardcoded AES-256-GCM key. Documents were exfiltrated in near real time to Dropbox, MEGA cloud, and free Korean web hosting.

Breakdown

Countries

  • South Korea

Targets

  • Industry: Government and policy professionals

Technical exposure

  • Windows users opening archive attachments delivered by reply-based spearphishing
  • Endpoints without scheduled-task and PowerShell script-block monitoring
  • Environments where Dropbox, MEGA and note-sharing services are permitted

Adversary

Kimsuky, a North Korea-linked espionage group (moderate-confidence attribution, Genians B/3)

Procedures (5)

  1. HWP-disguised LNK launches obfuscated PowerShell downloader

    Logs

    • Email security gateway log · First email with no attachment prompting a reply, then a zip via a webmail large-attachment feature; the LNK icon path points at a GitHub repo (norrisk983/hukushima) and its target runs cmd.exe launching hidden PowerShell that reconstructs a curl.exe download with z0-z13 character substitution before iex execution

    Detectors

    • Genian Insights E XBA detection · Behavior-based detection on execution of an HWP-disguised LNK launching hidden PowerShell and a curl.exe connection to free web hosting
  2. Scheduled task CommonMaintenanceHost persists note-page reader

    Logs

    • Windows Task Scheduler log · Task CommonMaintenanceHost created from %APPDATA% running wscript on a VBScript file with a disguised .Jcu extension that launches UPA.ps1 hidden, starting one minute after creation and repeating every 38 minutes
  3. Public note page serves hot-swappable in-memory payloads

    • T1105Ingress Tool Transfer

    Logs

    • Proxy and DNS log · UPA.ps1 periodically fetching an anotepad.com note page, extracting Base64 between the markers 887wgJs8 and nfJgcBl with a regex, and executing the decoded code with IEX; identical tradecraft seen on notepal.me and hypernotepad.com
  4. Documents and host data exfiltrated to cloud and free hosting

    • T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

    Logs

    • Proxy log · Dropbox API uploads using a hardcoded app key and refresh token to /victim-identifier/internal-IP/ paths; silent MEGAcmd installs to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MEGAcmd with hidden MEGAcmdServer.exe; document and image files uploaded to oppsite.dothome.co.kr
  5. NodeLinkRAT runs on legitimately installed Node.js runtime

    • T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
    • T1105Ingress Tool Transfer

    Logs

    • Sysmon Event ID 1 process creation · node-v24.21.0-win-x64.zip extracted to C:\Users\Public\Music\njs, npm installing socket.io-client, screenshot-desktop and ps-node, an unins000.dat completion marker, and node.exe running teamview.js while connecting over Socket.IO to 207.148.112.166 port 3000 with AES-256-GCM using hardcoded key 12345678901234567890123456789012

Indicators of compromise

IPs (5)

  • 103.81.116.10XenoRAT command server, India, port 443; hunt-only
  • 211.223.14.75XenoRAT command server, South Korea, port 443; hunt-only
  • 207.148.112.166NodeLinkRAT Socket.IO command server, Japan, port 3000; hunt-only
  • 185.27.134.2072024 phishing-kit infrastructure overlapping this actor; hunt-only
  • 185.27.134.1202024 phishing-kit infrastructure overlapping this actor; hunt-only

Domains (6)

  • anotepad[.]comPublic note service abused as the mutable C2 channel
  • epaper.dothome.co.krFree Korean web hosting serving the second-stage loader
  • oppsite.dothome.co.krFree Korean web hosting receiving exfiltrated documents
  • nid.weffm.p-e.krNodeLinkRAT alternate C2 on a free .kr domain service mimicking NAVER's nid subdomain
  • inmain.22web.orgPrior phishing-kit host in the same 185.27.134.0/24 subnet
  • owna.loveslife.bizPrior phishing-kit host in the same 185.27.134.0/24 subnet

Hashes (6)

  • 6985f297c03520a5852734a385322d8dXenoRAT variant 1 MD5, assembly title MSOfficeServer
  • a151531b792b1df1eec8d3a6a8e1ded5XenoRAT variant 2 MD5
  • a15df586bf29e7c1a5db64d603cee382XenoRAT variant 3 MD5, C2 211.223.14.75
  • 7575d230350299cfde0c4f993d761333Campaign sample MD5 published by Genians
  • cbcb66b530fb4f03d7dc9d55271b2ce4Campaign sample MD5 published by Genians
  • ef317291bf88651666133abe84f115f0Campaign sample MD5 published by Genians

Sources

Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).

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