Threat feed

MCH Caishen kit campaign

Rented MCH panel kit powered poisoned-script skimming and iOS exploitation and rebuilt within a day of takedown

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

Unattributed operators used poisoned third-party scripts to serve a card skimmer, a cryptocurrency clipper and an iOS exploit chain to visitors of major websites, then rebuilt their control infrastructure within a day of disclosure, according to Censys (A/2). On November 16, 2026, scripts injected through Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly loaded track.js from 1688360.cc on pages of the BBC, Zoom, CNN, DoorDash and GitLab. The payload skims card data with a Luhn check, swaps copied cryptocurrency addresses for eight wallets, and posts page URLs, cookies and screenshots to /hit.php; iOS visitors receive the Caishen exploit chain delivering Coruna and DarkSword payloads. Censys tied the infrastructure to a rented MCH control panel, a Caishen iOS exploit backend and energy-rental storefronts on 142, 144 and 55 web properties, linked by the kit's channel code 02111110. The loader likely came from the webshell.lol vendor BIBILZERODAY; within 24 hours of takedown the operator stood up five new panel hosts and the vendor re-listed DarkSword-27.1 packages. Hunting pivots include panel-title queries, the channel code and random 15-character .icu domains serving boot.js.

Breakdown

Targets

  • Industry: Opportunistic

Technical exposure

  • Pages embedding third-party scripts such as Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe
  • No Content Security Policy, or a CSP that permits the injected vendor script
  • iOS 18.6 or earlier devices receive the exploit chain via a hidden iframe

Adversary

Unattributed kit operator; Censys ARC assesses a rented loader from the webshell.lol vendor BIBILZERODAY and an off-the-shelf exploit kit

Procedures (3)

  1. Poison third-party script tags to load the campaign payload

    • T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

    Logs

    • Web server access logs and CSP violation reports on customer sites · Vendor scripts (Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, minute-ly) loading track.js from 1688360.cc or a script from webshell.lol/get.js

    Detectors

    • Censys Platform hunting queries for the MCH panel, Caishen backend and storefront titles · Published page-title queries locate kit deployments across hosting providersNot built-in
  2. Skim cards, clip crypto addresses and exfiltrate page data in the browser

    • T1189Drive-by Compromise
    • T1539Steal Web Session Cookie

    Logs

    • Egress proxy and DNS logs from visitor browsers · POSTs to 1688360.cc /card.php and /hit.php carrying card fields, cookies and page screenshots
  3. Stage the Caishen iOS exploit chain on mobile visitors

    • T1189Drive-by Compromise
    • T1203Exploitation for Client Execution

    Logs

    • Mobile device and network telemetry for iOS clients · Requests for boot.js on random 15-character .icu domains and hidden iframes to eil786npto9u5bq.icu on iOS 18.6 and earlier

Indicators of compromise

IPs (5)

  • 136.113.106.136Delivery host for track.js, /card.php and /hit.php
  • 34.96.213.201First staging server, observed November 9, 2026, with three .icu domains on one certificate
  • 34.124.226.157Second staging server with five sibling domains, observed November 14, 2026
  • 64.83.19.114Los Angeles service host running the MCH panel, Caishen backend, storefronts and stage loader on ports 8080-8090
  • 8.208.35.123Alibaba Cloud London service host with mch/c2/land role hostnames under jndft28.xyz

Domains (9)

  • 1688360.ccDelivery domain serving track.js and the /card.php and /hit.php exfiltration endpoints
  • webshell.lolLoader vendor domain advertising webshells and black-hat SEO under handle BIBILZERODAY, registered April 2024
  • 5vobauua3ojpklx.icuiOS stage loader domain serving boot.js
  • eil786npto9u5bq.icuHidden iframe target for iOS 18.6 and earlier
  • je4ft3gn8vxudum.icuMCH control panel host under the campaign certificate
  • 3601688.ccSibling domain on the second staging server
  • mch.jndft28.xyzMCH panel hostname on the London service host
  • c2.jndft28.xyzC2 role hostname on the London service host
  • land.jndft28.xyzLanding page hostname on the London service host

URLs (3)

  • http://webshell.lol/get.js400-byte loader that injects boot.js into any page running it
  • http://1688360.cc/card.phpCard skimmer exfiltration endpoint
  • http://1688360.cc/hit.phpPage-data exfiltration endpoint for URLs, cookies and screenshots

Hashes (3)

  • f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40SHA-256 of track.js captured on November 16, 2026
  • 123f813b18cf5a3b513beabd52a110e19f1c7834f2aa9b972633b2214c57e737SHA-256 of the loader get.js
  • 5698e9c039ab875e195b0b39ed57b9c10d200b341ab98f6bc489407cf03f8ecaSHA-256 of the campaign's payload certificate

Sources

Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).

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