MS SQL T-SQL malware campaign
Unattributed operators brute-force exposed Microsoft SQL Server instances to deploy XMRig and Gh0st RAT via T-SQL
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Unattributed operators, assessed by FortiGuard Labs as likely Chinese-speaking, have targeted internet-exposed Microsoft SQL Server instances since early October 2026, brute-forcing weak logins and abusing T-SQL to deploy an XMRig Monero miner and a Gh0st RAT variant on compromised servers, according to FortiGuard Labs (A/2). A UPX-packed Go binary embedding the Naabu scanner probes TCP port 1433, and a .NET brute-forcer tries accounts such as sa and admin against more than 2,700 passwords with 500 threads. On a successful login, T-SQL batches enable xp_cmdshell, download a loader from attacker HTTP and FTP servers, and create fake Microsoft Edge update tasks for persistence. The loader pulls an XMRig miner reporting hash rates to the operator and a Gh0st RAT variant with more than 30 commands including keylogging, screen capture and event-log wiping. The RAT enumerates 78 security products, steals Tencent QQ data, and persists via a Run key, a service and a 30-minute scheduled task. At least one United States server was confirmed compromised; hunting pivots include failed-login auditing, fake Edge update tasks, egress to staging domains and mining pool traffic.
Breakdown
Targets
- Industry: Opportunistic
Technical exposure
- Internet-exposed Microsoft SQL Server instance reachable on TCP 1433
- Weak or default SQL login credentials vulnerable to a 2700+ password dictionary
- xp_cmdshell and Ole Automation Procedures enabled on the instance
Adversary
Unattributed, suspected Chinese-speaking financially motivated operator (FortiGuard Labs assessment)
Procedures (3)
Scan /16 ranges for exposed SQL Server and brute-force logins
Logs
SQL Server error log and Windows Security event log (failed sa/admin login bursts) · High-volume failed SQL authentication attempts from a single source, often hundreds within minutes
- Perimeter firewall or NetFlow records · TCP SYN scan patterns against port 1433 across /16 address ranges
Detectors
- FortiGuard IPS signature MS.SQL.Server.Brute.Force.Login · Detects brute force attacks against Microsoft SQL Server
Enable xp_cmdshell via T-SQL and stage loader over HTTP/FTP
Logs
SQL Server audit and trace records for xp_cmdshell reconfiguration and execution · sp_configure enabling xp_cmdshell, Ole Automation activation, and EXEC xp_cmdshell downloads into C:\Users\Public
- Proxy or egress web and FTP logs · Downloads from site.vietnam852.com:88 and ftp.vietnam852.com, including 2018.sql, dwm.exe and down.exe
Detectors
- FortiGuard Web Filtering rating for campaign domains and URLs · Domains and URLs associated with this campaign rated Malicious Websites
Persist with fake Edge update tasks and deploy miner plus Gh0st RAT
Logs
Windows Task Scheduler operational log and registry Run key monitoring · Tasks named Microsoft_UPDATES or mimicking MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachine GUIDs running every 30 minutes or daily at 01:00
- Endpoint process and network telemetry · MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe with XMRig mining traffic to xmr-ru.kryptex.network port 7029 and the XMRig Reporter user agent on site.vietnam852.com
Detectors
- FortiGuard AntiVirus signatures W64/MSSQLBruteforcer.F62C!tr, W64/Agent.DRN!tr, W32/Agent.DAV!tr, MSIL/Agent.AFL!tr · Detects the brute-forcer, loader and payload files of this campaign
Indicators of compromise
Domains (6)
- site.vietnam852.comStaging and C2 server on port 88; serves ip.php, 2018.sql and tool files, receives host registration POSTs and miner reports
- ftp.vietnam852.comFTP payload staging server for loader and payload downloads
- server.vietnam852.comGh0st RAT C2 endpoint on port 8000
- www.swordaa.comSecond hardcoded Gh0st RAT C2 endpoint on port 8000
- site.hfgjjkrewjk.comSecondary staging server also serving /tj/xmr.php miner reporting
- site.jiancai008.comSecondary staging server hosting dllhost.exe, winlogon.exe and miner payload files on port 88
URLs (4)
- http://site.vietnam852.com:88/ip.phpReturns target IP range for Naabu scanning
- http://site.vietnam852.com:88/2026/2018.sqlMalicious T-SQL command file enabling xp_cmdshell
- http://ftp.vietnam852.com:88/post.phpReceives compromised host registration data
- http://site.vietnam852.com/tj/xmr.phpMiner status reporting endpoint with XMRig Reporter user agent
Hashes (6)
- 8CE2CD98EF6CEEECE8239936E4AEA042C41807F632CD691D5091705BF6C0076Ddllhost.exe, UPX-packed Go scanner embedding Naabu (SHA-256)
- F5444E8E9E9E019693AACB363B7441AC0B8ECFE96A77FD94B9C312A017588EB42018.sql, malicious T-SQL command file (SHA-256)
- 124774698FD3EDE0800015D19C2BD6C1869D03BBC2E6E8DBE2F69D2978F7F4D0dwm.exe, .NET SQL brute-forcer (CSQL.exe assembly) (SHA-256)
- 125D3A0EFE7699BB20397C13F0F4993AD893952727487B4D190E386A5B14C427down.exe / google.exe / payload.exe loader (SHA-256)
- 2A23E10BFC097E98295CBFF8124BD403C4CB677E709B48CCC53D6ACA216C3061MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe, Themida-packed XMRig Monero miner (SHA-256)
- 3F64B0146B323C5716043360E84384A5A197A897F46088DF93A910470A29E1A0winlogon.exe, Themida-packed Gh0st RAT variant (SHA-256)
Sources
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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