Operation CloudFire session hijacking
Calendar invites and a live MFA proxy steal corporate Google sessions at scale
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Material Security disclosed that an unattributed phishing operation has stolen live Google sessions from corporate users since mid-August 2026, using calendar invites from compromised sender accounts, Google's own redirector, and a live reverse proxy that relays multi-factor authentication, before a month-long disruption effort burned 897 attacker domains (grade B/2). Links pass through Google's redirector with the lure domain in a query parameter, land on Turnstile-gated gateways, and open a JavaScript-built sign-in page in front of the genuine Google login, so the harvester never exists as a fetchable page. The proxy relays SMS codes, authenticator codes, number-matching prompts and phone recovery in real time, capturing the authenticated session; operators then replay it from their own infrastructure and can grant OAuth access that survives a password reset. Defenders should scrutinize calendar invitations and file-share lures, correlate Workspace login successes with token authorize events across multiple source IPs, and revoke sessions and OAuth grants rather than only resetting passwords.
Breakdown
Countries
- United States
Targets
- Industry: Enterprise Google Workspace users
Technical exposure
- Tenants relying on password resets after session theft
- Mail gateways that do not inspect calendar invitations
- Domain reputation feeds miss freshly registered lure domains
Adversary
Unattributed operator using the Nyasher framework · Material Security (grade B/2)
Procedures (3)
Calendar-invite lures from compromised senders via Google's redirector
- T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1586.002Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts
Logs
- Google Workspace email audit logs · Calendar invitations and file-share lures from known correspondents or via BCC carrying www.google.com/url redirector links with a destination in the query parameter
Detectors
- Material Security campaign detections · Calendar-invite phishing combining technical indicators, message intent, destination links and sender-relationship history
Turnstile-gated gateway to a live reverse proxy of the Google sign-in
- T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1090Proxy
Logs
- Google Workspace login audit logs · Sign-in flows reaching accounts.google.com through newly registered domains with hex tokens, Cloudflare Turnstile challenges, and sessions completed on infrastructure the victim never visited
Session replay and OAuth grants that survive password resets
Logs
- Google Workspace admin audit logs · Token authorize events for new OAuth applications within 30 minutes of a login success, where more than one source IP is involved for the same user
Indicators of compromise
Domains (1)
- hostvipxfl.comGateway domain observed serving a live proxy of the genuine Google sign-in flow, per Material Security research
Sources
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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