Threat feed

OPTIMJACK Optimizely script hijacking

Unattributed attacker injected a crypto clipper and card skimmer into Optimizely-hosted scripts served to 178 organizations

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

An unattributed attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely's account signup flow to inject a crypto-clipper and card-skimmer script that Optimizely's own CDN served to visitors of 178 organizations including the BBC, Zoom and HSBC, Report URI reports (B/2). The code was written on November 16 into each project's Project JavaScript field, a custom-code field that runs on every page, and 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets checked were infected. The payload swapped copied wallet addresses across nine chains, skimmed cards from checkout forms, stole cookies and screenshots, and loaded the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits on iPhones and iPads. Report URI's Threat Intelligence pipeline flagged the first instance in a Content Security Policy report at 15:06 UTC, and Optimizely says it fixed the flaw, removed the injected code and revoked tokens. Material uncertainty: the attacker's identity is unknown and verified theft is small so far, about USD 7,040.

Breakdown

Targets

OrganizationsIndustries

  • Organization: BBC
  • Organization: CNN
  • Organization: Zoom
  • Organization: Salesforce
  • Organization: GitLab
  • Organization: IKEA
  • Organization: HSBC
  • Organization: Equifax
  • Organization: Air France-KLM
  • Organization: Ledger
  • Industry: Banking and finance
  • Industry: Technology and SaaS
  • Industry: Retail

Technical exposure

  • Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet on public pages
  • Project JavaScript custom-code field writable via signup-flow flaw
  • No Content-Security-Policy restricting third-party script sources
  • Checkout forms on pages loading the snippet

Adversary

Unattributed · Optimizely confirms an unauthorized party exploited an Experimentation signup-flow flaw (A/2)

Procedures (5)

  1. Trusted Optimizely snippet loads attacker payload domain

    • T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

    Logs

    • CSP violation reports · Report-Only or enforcing CSP violation: script-src or connect-src violation for 1688360.cc/track.js loaded from a page that also loads cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project ID>.js; first flagged 2026-11-16T15:06:23Z
    • Web proxy logs · HTTP request: 1688360.cc/track.js initiated by a page on an affected domain; loader variants include base64 atob() and a full inline copy with eval fallback

    Detectors

    • Report URI Threat Intelligence · Flags malicious JavaScript and IoC domains in CSP violation reports
  2. Crypto clipper swaps copied wallet addresses

    Logs

    • Browser or EDR endpoint telemetry · Clipboard rewrite during copy of a wallet address; page artifacts window._k7, window._cc, window._qxc, sessionStorage keys starting cc_; replacement addresses hard-coded in track.js across BTC, ETH, LTC, TRX, TON, SOL, BCH and DOGE
  3. Card skimmer exfiltrates checkout form data

    Logs

    • Web proxy logs · POST of type text/plain to /hit.php and beacon to /card.php with fields n, e, c, u from visitor sessions on affected domains; card numbers captured from checkout forms
  4. Cookies and screenshots stolen from visitor sessions

    Logs

    • Web proxy logs · Requests to /html2canvas.min.js and exfiltration to /hit.php carrying cookie values and screenshots from affected pages
  5. iOS exploit kits loaded on iPhones and iPads

    • T1189Drive-by Compromise

    Logs

    • Web proxy logs · Requests from iOS or iPadOS user agents to .icu domains hosting /boot.js, /JIUJIU888/weifile.html and /A8/a.html (Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits); data-channel-code 02111110
    • DNS logs · Queries for random-label .icu domains registered November 9 and 16, resolving to 34.87.36.58 or 34.96.213.201, from visitor networks

Indicators of compromise

IPs (3)

  • 136.113.106.136last A record for 1688360.cc, Google Cloud us-central1; hunt-only
  • 34.87.36.58iOS stage host, Google Cloud Singapore; hunt-only
  • 34.96.213.201iOS stage host, Google Cloud Hong Kong; hunt-only

Domains (9)

  • 1688360.ccpayload and exfiltration host, registered 2026-11-16 05:23 UTC, registry hold since 2026-11-17 00:37 UTC
  • webshell.lolinjector domain /get.js tied to same actor by Helme; unverified by StepSecurity
  • eil786npto9u5bq.icuiOS exploit kit stage; hunt-only
  • 1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icuiOS exploit kit stage; hunt-only
  • gm38duxoihbmy5o.icuiOS exploit kit stage; hunt-only
  • 5vobauua3ojpklx.icuiOS exploit kit stage, still resolving; hunt-only
  • p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icuiOS exploit kit stage, still resolving; hunt-only
  • l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icuiOS exploit kit stage behind Cloudflare; hunt-only
  • q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icuiOS exploit kit stage behind Cloudflare; hunt-only

URLs (2)

  • https://1688360.cc/track.jsloader injected into Project JavaScript fields
  • https://webshell.lol/get.jsinjector seen in a BBC snippet from 04:21 UTC Nov 16; unverified

Hashes (2)

  • 617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3track.js first urlscan capture, 28 KB
  • f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40track.js final version live from 17:56 UTC; 26 builds counted on Nov 16

Sources

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