PerfectPioneer KUKURAT HTTP/3 RATs
TGR-STA-0049 spies on Southeast Asian governments with HTTP/3 RATs PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
A cyberespionage actor tracked as TGR-STA-0049, also known as REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon, has spied on Southeast Asian government networks since at least July 2025 using two custom RATs that hide command-and-control inside HTTP/3 over QUIC, Unit 42 reports (B/2). Initial access came from exploited Exchange and web servers carrying ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5 web shells, plus phishing with Myanmar election commission decoys, then DLL sideloading of XOR-encrypted shellcode. After taking a Domain Controller, the actor installed domain log-on scripts that download KUKURAT to each user's endpoint at authentication. The Go-based PerfectPioneer RAT runs files, shells, keylogging, screenshots, SOCKS5 proxying and process injection, while the C++ KUKURAT loads twelve-plus modules on demand, brute-forces SMB, and camouflages itself with decoy web traffic and registry noise. The actor dumped LSASS through comsvcs MiniDump invoked by ordinal, ran DCSync and SharpDPAPI, and granted a compromised Exchange account FullAccess to every mailbox. Material uncertainty: Unit 42 does not name the exploited server vulnerabilities or the victim countries.
Breakdown
Countries
- Myanmar
- Southeast Asia
- South America
- Europe
Targets
- Industry: Government
Technical exposure
- Internet-facing Exchange or web servers unpatched
- Domain controllers with writable log-on scripts
- Outbound UDP 443 (QUIC) allowed from endpoints
- Exchange accounts holding ApplicationImpersonation role
Adversary
TGR-STA-0049 (aka REF7707, Earth Alux, Ink Dragon) · Unit 42 tracking (B/2)
Procedures (6)
Web shells planted on exploited servers
Logs
Web server and Exchange logs · POST requests to ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5 web shell paths; reconnaissance commands and payload staging from web worker processes on internet-facing servers
DLL sideloading decrypts shellcode into the RAT
- T1574.002
Logs
- EDR process telemetry · Modified legitimate executables embedding XOR-encrypted shellcode loading a side-loaded DLL; executables with PDF icons launching malware beside a decoy document; decoy installers running a GlobalProtect setup as cover while the RAT installs in the background
Domain log-on scripts deploy KUKURAT at authentication
- T1037.001Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows)
Logs
File server audit logs · Unauthorized scripts modified in the SYSVOL netlogon share and Group Policy objects; downloads and executions triggered by domain-user authentication
- EDR process telemetry · Suspicious processes executing with domain-user SIDs during logon; PsExec, WMI and WinRM remote management used for lateral movement
RAT command-and-control hidden in HTTP/3 over QUIC
- T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Logs
Firewall and proxy logs · UDP 443 QUIC flows to www.maui-cocktailbar.com, ads-edge.com, www.wkuyda.com, www.thailisting.com or www.yangon.it.com for PerfectPioneer, or www.cloudflacecdn.com, www.police.gr.com or www.investigationj6.com for KUKURAT; paths /agent/register, /agent/heartbeat, /agent/tasks, /agent/result and hashed endpoints such as /c8a4e192; rat_http3_cc opens a local HTTP monitor on port 56793
Detectors
- Palo Alto Networks Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security · Flags the campaign C2 domains and IP addresses published in the Unit 42 IOC list
Credentials and mailboxes harvested
Logs
- EDR process telemetry · rundll32.exe invoking comsvcs.dll MiniDump by ordinal #+000024; SharpDPAPI, Mimikatz and ProcDump executions; manual dumps of the SAM and SYSTEM hives
Exchange admin logs · Add-MailboxPermission loops granting a compromised account FullAccess across all mailboxes; checks and grants of the ApplicationImpersonation role
KUKURAT modules run with camouflage and watchdogs
Logs
- EDR process and file telemetry · A service named PsExec creating pipe \\.\pipe\PSEXEC that self-uninstalls after five minutes idle; watchdog writing to named pipe WINDOW_SEC_WATCHDOG every three seconds; modules BofLoader.dll, MyPsExec.dll, SmbBrute.dll, yuze_dll.dll and ComExec.dll; decoy Chrome crash-recovery registry keys under HKCU\Software\Google\Chrome and ten random HTTP requests per cycle to popular websites; deployment under C:\ProgramData\Cyvera\Ransomware\
Indicators of compromise
IPs (2)
- 27.254.164.212campaign infrastructure
- 27.254.164.209campaign infrastructure
Domains (9)
- www.maui-cocktailbar.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
- ads-edge.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
- www.wkuyda.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
- www.thailisting.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
- www.yangon.it.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
- www.cloudflacecdn.comKUKURAT C2, typosquat of Cloudflare CDN
- www.police.gr.comKUKURAT C2
- www.investigationj6.comKUKURAT C2
- www.sacofficegov.comcampaign domain masquerading as government site
Hashes (7)
- 5b7effbf0465c05e8dc9a8fea69b000a78237735ea0b854e8d9baee5b7af8344SHA-256 PerfectPioneer newhttp3 core agent
- 61f7e2f4159c566578e88cb05cdf49e4378f45ebddbd332224e97c11df922120SHA-256 PerfectPioneer newhttp3 loader DLL
- b8dca1c7e7a74ce82ab4e4cad9b718a458735d2c6c956e4cf3109aac59bfd0e4SHA-256 KUKURAT HTTP/3 variant
- 7225ef57161cf0908560811be798d22e9354c071d576540a43aa7900784c0688SHA-256 KUKURAT HTTP/2 variant
- 34cc9bc4a533b91e7cdb30fecc57ba609dc890780fd13ecfbc253047b3b37b78SHA-256 KUKURAT PsExecService.exe module
- b062b4d8c19baf5c1568e28b3e0a5e2318e9501ea61ddfe804d9755c1bdbf887SHA-256 KUKURAT watchdog process
- 0cbde9b7f59dafca80f214121a04eda7804b920da28ce1c06939a4783e6b097fSHA-256 SharpDPAPI used by the actor
Sources
- B/2Palo Alto Networks Unit 42: QUIC and Covert, Novel HTTP/3-Powered RATs Target Southeast Asian Governments
- C/3Sechot Security Daily 2026-11-17: Unit 42 reports TGR-STA-0049 targeting Southeast Asian governments
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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