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PerfectPioneer KUKURAT HTTP/3 RATs

TGR-STA-0049 spies on Southeast Asian governments with HTTP/3 RATs PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

A cyberespionage actor tracked as TGR-STA-0049, also known as REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon, has spied on Southeast Asian government networks since at least July 2025 using two custom RATs that hide command-and-control inside HTTP/3 over QUIC, Unit 42 reports (B/2). Initial access came from exploited Exchange and web servers carrying ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5 web shells, plus phishing with Myanmar election commission decoys, then DLL sideloading of XOR-encrypted shellcode. After taking a Domain Controller, the actor installed domain log-on scripts that download KUKURAT to each user's endpoint at authentication. The Go-based PerfectPioneer RAT runs files, shells, keylogging, screenshots, SOCKS5 proxying and process injection, while the C++ KUKURAT loads twelve-plus modules on demand, brute-forces SMB, and camouflages itself with decoy web traffic and registry noise. The actor dumped LSASS through comsvcs MiniDump invoked by ordinal, ran DCSync and SharpDPAPI, and granted a compromised Exchange account FullAccess to every mailbox. Material uncertainty: Unit 42 does not name the exploited server vulnerabilities or the victim countries.

Breakdown

Countries

  • Myanmar
  • Southeast Asia
  • South America
  • Europe

Targets

  • Industry: Government

Technical exposure

  • Internet-facing Exchange or web servers unpatched
  • Domain controllers with writable log-on scripts
  • Outbound UDP 443 (QUIC) allowed from endpoints
  • Exchange accounts holding ApplicationImpersonation role

Adversary

TGR-STA-0049 (aka REF7707, Earth Alux, Ink Dragon) · Unit 42 tracking (B/2)

Procedures (6)

  1. Web shells planted on exploited servers

    • T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell
    • T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

    Logs

    • Web server and Exchange logs · POST requests to ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5 web shell paths; reconnaissance commands and payload staging from web worker processes on internet-facing servers
  2. DLL sideloading decrypts shellcode into the RAT

    • T1574.002

    Logs

    • EDR process telemetry · Modified legitimate executables embedding XOR-encrypted shellcode loading a side-loaded DLL; executables with PDF icons launching malware beside a decoy document; decoy installers running a GlobalProtect setup as cover while the RAT installs in the background
  3. Domain log-on scripts deploy KUKURAT at authentication

    • T1037.001Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows)

    Logs

    • File server audit logs · Unauthorized scripts modified in the SYSVOL netlogon share and Group Policy objects; downloads and executions triggered by domain-user authentication
    • EDR process telemetry · Suspicious processes executing with domain-user SIDs during logon; PsExec, WMI and WinRM remote management used for lateral movement
  4. RAT command-and-control hidden in HTTP/3 over QUIC

    • T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

    Logs

    • Firewall and proxy logs · UDP 443 QUIC flows to www.maui-cocktailbar.com, ads-edge.com, www.wkuyda.com, www.thailisting.com or www.yangon.it.com for PerfectPioneer, or www.cloudflacecdn.com, www.police.gr.com or www.investigationj6.com for KUKURAT; paths /agent/register, /agent/heartbeat, /agent/tasks, /agent/result and hashed endpoints such as /c8a4e192; rat_http3_cc opens a local HTTP monitor on port 56793

    Detectors

    • Palo Alto Networks Advanced URL Filtering and Advanced DNS Security · Flags the campaign C2 domains and IP addresses published in the Unit 42 IOC list
  5. Credentials and mailboxes harvested

    Logs

    • EDR process telemetry · rundll32.exe invoking comsvcs.dll MiniDump by ordinal #+000024; SharpDPAPI, Mimikatz and ProcDump executions; manual dumps of the SAM and SYSTEM hives
    • Exchange admin logs · Add-MailboxPermission loops granting a compromised account FullAccess across all mailboxes; checks and grants of the ApplicationImpersonation role
  6. KUKURAT modules run with camouflage and watchdogs

    • T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging
    • T1110.001Brute Force: Password Guessing
    • T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy

    Logs

    • EDR process and file telemetry · A service named PsExec creating pipe \\.\pipe\PSEXEC that self-uninstalls after five minutes idle; watchdog writing to named pipe WINDOW_SEC_WATCHDOG every three seconds; modules BofLoader.dll, MyPsExec.dll, SmbBrute.dll, yuze_dll.dll and ComExec.dll; decoy Chrome crash-recovery registry keys under HKCU\Software\Google\Chrome and ten random HTTP requests per cycle to popular websites; deployment under C:\ProgramData\Cyvera\Ransomware\

Indicators of compromise

IPs (2)

  • 27.254.164.212campaign infrastructure
  • 27.254.164.209campaign infrastructure

Domains (9)

  • www.maui-cocktailbar.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
  • ads-edge.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
  • www.wkuyda.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
  • www.thailisting.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
  • www.yangon.it.comPerfectPioneer RAT C2
  • www.cloudflacecdn.comKUKURAT C2, typosquat of Cloudflare CDN
  • www.police.gr.comKUKURAT C2
  • www.investigationj6.comKUKURAT C2
  • www.sacofficegov.comcampaign domain masquerading as government site

Hashes (7)

  • 5b7effbf0465c05e8dc9a8fea69b000a78237735ea0b854e8d9baee5b7af8344SHA-256 PerfectPioneer newhttp3 core agent
  • 61f7e2f4159c566578e88cb05cdf49e4378f45ebddbd332224e97c11df922120SHA-256 PerfectPioneer newhttp3 loader DLL
  • b8dca1c7e7a74ce82ab4e4cad9b718a458735d2c6c956e4cf3109aac59bfd0e4SHA-256 KUKURAT HTTP/3 variant
  • 7225ef57161cf0908560811be798d22e9354c071d576540a43aa7900784c0688SHA-256 KUKURAT HTTP/2 variant
  • 34cc9bc4a533b91e7cdb30fecc57ba609dc890780fd13ecfbc253047b3b37b78SHA-256 KUKURAT PsExecService.exe module
  • b062b4d8c19baf5c1568e28b3e0a5e2318e9501ea61ddfe804d9755c1bdbf887SHA-256 KUKURAT watchdog process
  • 0cbde9b7f59dafca80f214121a04eda7804b920da28ce1c06939a4783e6b097fSHA-256 SharpDPAPI used by the actor

Sources

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