Threat feed

PowerPanel Business DC execution chain

Unattributed actor abused CyberPower PowerPanel Business on a domain controller as a SYSTEM execution channel to dump Active Directory

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

An unattributed threat actor turned CyberPower PowerPanel Business, a UPS management suite installed on a Windows domain controller, into a trusted SYSTEM execution channel to dump the Active Directory database and launch a persistent implant, according to Symantec Threat Intelligence (A/2). The 18 November 2026 report discloses a new intrusion vector: scripts uploaded through the product web console's file-upload endpoint on TCP port 3052 were staged in the power-event extcmd folder and executed by the SYSTEM-privileged ppbed.exe service. The actor used the channel to fetch tools with certutil and curl, load a .NET antivirus killer in memory via PowerShell, collect ntds.dit and the SYSTEM hive with ntdsutil, esentutl and vssadmin, and launch an implant named upnpcont.exe that side-loads a malicious atl.dll from the SYSTEM profile. Initial access is unresolved: known PowerPanel Business flaws (hard-coded credentials, a default administrator password, an upload path-traversal flaw) and stolen administrator credentials all remain possibilities. No exfiltration or ransomware was observed and no CVE is confirmed exploited; the activity was human-operated and iterative.

Breakdown

Technical exposure

  • CyberPower PowerPanel Business installed on a Windows domain controller
  • PowerPanel web console on TCP 3052 with default or stolen admin credentials
  • Power-event script feature enabled in the PowerPanel Business console

Adversary

Unattributed · Symantec Threat Intelligence (A/2)

Procedures (5)

  1. Scripts uploaded through the PowerPanel web console upload endpoint

    • T1105Ingress Tool Transfer

    Logs

    • Firewall or proxy logs · HTTP POST to <host>:3052/local/rest/v1/file/upload reaching the PowerPanel Business web service; management traffic to TCP 3052 from unexpected sources
    • EDR file events · File created: upload_*.tmp under the product's web-server\work\tomcat\localhost\local directory, then pp*.cmd or ifm*.cmd files appearing in ...\CyberPower PowerPanel Business\temp\profile\extcmd\ without an admin action
  2. PowerPanel service runs uploaded scripts as SYSTEM via cmd

    • T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

    Logs

    • Sysmon process creation events · Event ID 1: cmd.exe spawned by ppbed.exe with a command line of cmd /c pointing at a .cmd file in the extcmd folder; script names match pp?????.cmd or ifm*.cmd; all children run as SYSTEM (S-1-5-18)
  3. Tools fetched with certutil and curl, .NET loaded in memory

    • T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
    • T1620Reflective Code Loading

    Logs

    • EDR process events · Process created: certutil or curl beneath the ppbed.exe lineage downloading dt.bin, wupd.bin or hello.bin; powershell.exe loading a .NET assembly in memory
    • EDR network events · Outbound connection: 84.200.205.145 on ports 55556 or 55557; first seen for the host; process chain rooted at ppbed.exe

    Detectors

    • Symantec endpoint protection · MSIL.Killav!gen1 - detects the .NET antivirus-killer tool (wupd.exe) downloaded in this intrusion
  4. Active Directory database collected with ntdsutil, esentutl and vssadmin

    • T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS

    Logs

    • Sysmon process creation events · Event ID 1 on a domain controller: ntdsutil with ac i fm, esentutl /vss, vssadmin create shadow /for=C: or robocopy collecting ntds.dit and the SYSTEM hive - all with ppbed.exe in the process ancestry
  5. Implant launched as upnpcont.exe side-loading malicious atl.dll

    • T1574.002
    • T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

    Logs

    • EDR process events · Process created: upnpcont.exe from C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\50679f292a1; lineage ppbed.exe -> cmd.exe -> powershell.exe -> upnpcont.exe
    • EDR file events · File created: upnpcont.exe and atl.dll together in the same systemprofile AppData\Local\50679f292a1 folder

Indicators of compromise

IPs (1)

  • 84.200.205.145tool download host, ports 55556/55557; hunt-only, single origin

URLs (2)

  • http://84.200.205.145:55556/tool staging path (dt.bin, wupd.bin, hello.bin); hunt-only
  • http://84.200.205.145:55557/junk50k.bindownloaded file; hunt-only

Hashes (8)

  • 5b2285f788eec4d17bf18d85795d457f40f7598bbab2697919f5810f54a9c3feSHA-256 upnpcont.exe implant
  • d4032e61aa9ef01a5a174a90beffa5a27dd21b36e653ce5304907787554b7d95SHA-256 atl.dll side-loaded by the implant
  • bdea608430fbf6384ce518a542af3e0e69a685980ef826f7db3de20d4c835e26SHA-256 wupd.exe .NET antivirus killer (MSIL.Killav!gen1)
  • d8ae46604dc4eab411977764bd923af686aea117fb33304520d928f1d382ef0eSHA-256 hello.exe downloaded tool
  • 3d73d5342a11dce35081e70a4ea75d39ad65bc6d480337bd33c1d2e0ba4090eeSHA-256 dt.exe downloaded tool
  • 12e716f48875befa978ff4a78a0b99a18b1809fc5bcc34c761158875da611aa8SHA-256 dt.exe downloaded tool, second sample
  • 22b8f2776f1c941d8240ee4243da537147f8d2ee4d859a68038335da7b0d7688SHA-256 ppskbcx.cmd uploaded extcmd script
  • cbd790d052a57d18f1cd58fe4c9887340eec5d38bfae105caf0d222f30a856d5SHA-256 ifm.cmd ntdsutil collection script

Sources

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