Qilin Agenda modular Rust ransomware
Qilin (Agenda) Rust ransomware spreads through Active Directory and ESXi and prints notes on network printers
Posted · Updated · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Qilin (aka Agenda) ransomware-as-a-service operators and affiliates are using a modular Rust ransomware that Seqrite Labs reverse-engineered from March and October 2026 samples (Seqrite Labs, B/2). The October variant installs RSAT to enumerate Active Directory, spreads with embedded PsExec over admin shares, and carries a vCenter and ESXi module that disables HA and DRS, enables SSH and uploads ELF payloads. It forces a Safe Mode reboot to sidestep EDR, purges shadow copies, prints ransom notes to network printers and self-deletes. Acronis TRU (2026-10-28, B/2) independently documents ESXi SSH enablement, payload upload to ESXi hosts, shadow-copy deletion and remote symlink evaluation changes.
Breakdown
Targets
- Industry: Healthcare
- Industry: Manufacturing
- Industry: Education
- Industry: Technology
Technical exposure
- Windows hosts reachable by harvested admin credentials over ADMIN$ and C$
- vCenter and ESXi management reachable with SSH enable allowed
- EDR not blocking Safe Mode reboot or shadow-copy deletion
- Network printers accepting raw print on TCP 9100
Adversary
Qilin (aka Agenda) RaaS operators and affiliates · Seqrite Labs and Acronis TRU analyze its payloads (B/2)
Procedures (10)
Boot set to Safe Mode to sidestep EDR
- T1562.009
Logs
- Process creation · process_start: bcdedit.exe; contains '/set' and 'safeboot' (minimal or network)
Sysmon Registry · Sysmon EID 13 (registry value set)
Volume shadow copies deleted
- T1490Inhibit System Recovery
Logs
- Process creation · process_start: vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe; 'delete shadows' or 'shadowcopy delete'
Windows Security · 4688 (process creation): \vssadmin.exe or \wmic.exe; 'delete shadows' or 'shadowcopy delete'
Ransomware copied to admin shares and run as a service
- T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Logs
Windows System · 7045 (service installed): PSEXESVC or a new random service name; a path under C:\Windows or a share-written binary
Windows Security · 5145 (network share object access): \\*\ADMIN$ or \\*\C$; an .exe file name; includes WriteData (0x2)
RSAT installed to enumerate domain computers
- T1018Remote System Discovery
Logs
- Process creation · process_start: dism.exe; contains 'Rsat.ActiveDirectory'; the ransomware binary (non-installer parent)
PowerShell Operational · 4104 (script block logged): contains 'Get-ADComputer'
SSH enabled on ESXi hosts and ELF payloads staged
- T1021.004Remote Services: SSH
Logs
- VMware ESXi hostd / vobd · SSH service started: contains 'esx.audit.ssh.enabled' or 'SSH access has been enabled'; an ESXi host
- VMware ESXi auth/shell · SSH login then file write
HA and DRS disabled on the virtualization cluster
- T1490Inhibit System Recovery
Logs
- VMware vCenter events · ClusterReconfiguredEvent: ClusterReconfiguredEvent; dasConfig.enabled = false or drsConfig.enabled = false; account that made the change
Files encrypted, extension appended, note per folder
- T1486Data Encrypted for Impact
Logs
- File events · file_rename / file_create: the same new 10-character extension across many files; README-RECOVER-*.txt; one process writing across many directories
Payload deletes itself after a delay
- T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Logs
- Process creation · process_start: cmd.exe; contains 'timeout' and '& Del' with the parent's own image path; equals the file path being deleted
Remote symbolic link evaluation enabled
- T1222.001File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows Permissions
Logs
- Process creation · process_start: fsutil.exe; contains 'SymlinkEvaluation' and 'R2R:1' or 'R2L:1'
Sysmon Registry · Sysmon EID 13 (registry value set)
Ransom notes sent to network printers on port 9100
- T1491.001Defacement: Internal Defacement
Logs
- Network connections · connection_start: 9100; a non-spooler process (not spoolsv.exe); many distinct internal hosts in a short window
- Traffic · allowed session: 9100; a workstation or server reaching many printer IPs
Indicators of compromise
Domains (1)
- meuu4pqh6g4aqjk5i6ama4dt5z365qgilwfn53iqcyrdbzkd3d4secyd.onionQilin network indicator, Acronis
URLs (3)
- http://kbsqoivihgdmwczmxkbovk7ss2dcynitwhhfu5yw725dboqo5kthfaad.onionQilin portal, Acronis
- http://ijzn3sicrcy7guixkzjkib4ukbiilwc3xhnmby4mcbccnsd7j2rekvqd.onionQilin portal, Acronis
- https://wikileaks2.site/leak distribution site, Acronis
Hashes (7)
- 24a24c5fe9a5dc242b2908d020f890ed5b3afe8146fade4e3ab8a07d19007b6dsha256 (Qilin Windows payload, Acronis)
- 011dcd84bc7b8faa8c32020f3530be599d213888c0e8b750b95595f8ff331756sha256 (Qilin Windows payload, Acronis)
- 516927b55038c1702bc8a6a0262a39d5fe45f4b07527fdc42415533a9665264asha256 (Qilin Windows payload, Acronis)
- 43672ef1384888922c13838f695da58f8cb9b8ad47ce896b3b7151e7edd18afbsha256 (Qilin Windows payload, Acronis)
- bd1cf7823cabbac2ea7b45f2d7c9dfcd6b9a24714b6d40377bdef82b9c88021bsha256 (Qilin Windows payload, Acronis)
- 4f8efbfe1f94dc7c6d5547c836e56ed56b1b3c33d324bd8619b8108c572b5ca6sha256 (Qilin Windows payload, Acronis)
- e81e9a3a8baca74a5c73bb5d0904cd7ac145e330c4d4993bfd671f3396402416sha256 (Qilin Windows payload, Acronis)
Sources
- B/2Seqrite Labs: The Evolution of Qilin (Agenda): A Comparative Reverse Engineering Analysis of Qilin Ransomware Across 2026
- B/2Acronis TRU: Inside Qilin ransomware: ESXi attacks, affiliate networks and double extortion
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
Questions, detections or sightings of Qilin Agenda modular Rust ransomware? Bring them to the community.