Threat feed

SCKit ScreenConnect rogue client worm

SCKit worm turns hijacked ScreenConnect panels against MSP technicians

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

Unattributed attackers seized cloud-hosted ScreenConnect management instances at managed service providers from November 11 and used the console's Run Command to push rogue ScreenConnect clients and the worm-like SCKit toolkit onto managed endpoints, hitting 288 endpoints across 48 organizations in the first wave, Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Blackpoint Cyber report. On each endpoint the client service ran cmd.exe, using curl to fetch and silently install a rogue ScreenConnect client connecting to the attacker's relay; a decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev keyed to the MachineGuid extracted the SCKit bundle. RelayTrap persisted via the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run key and a watcher task polling every 10 seconds, compiled against the endpoint's ScreenConnect libraries, and wrote Defender exclusions. When a technician with a client older than 26.6.5 connected, RelayTrap tried to push its launcher via CVE-2026-84869; no technician compromise was observed in testing. A browser component stole .ASPXAUTH cookies from Chrome, Edge and Opera, and ToolboxRelayUploader used stolen console sessions to push payloads through the Shared Toolbox. Clients must be updated to 26.6.5.9742 or later.

Breakdown

Targets

  • Industry: Managed service providers

Technical exposure

  • RMM+ extension 1.0.31 or 1.0.32 configured without an access key
  • ScreenConnect technician host clients older than 26.6.5
  • Endpoints trusting the MSP ScreenConnect console for command execution

Adversary

Unattributed threat actor; initial access route under investigation, RMM+ extension empty-key authentication suspected

Procedures (7)

  1. Run Command execution from hijacked cloud panel

    • T1219Remote Access Tools
    • T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

    Logs

    • ScreenConnect console audit logs · Run Command history and remote-command API calls issued without a technician session, including commands delivered through the RMM+ extension API
  2. Rogue ScreenConnect client installation

    • T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
    • T1218.007System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec

    Logs

    • Sysmon Event ID 1 and 3 · cmd.exe and curl.exe children of the ScreenConnect endpoint client downloading ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi with an Exploited marker, saved as C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi and installed silently, then connecting to attacker relays such as sc[.]payproofkit[.]com or 185[.]99[.]255[.]28
  3. SCKit decoder staging keyed to MachineGuid

    • T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • T1105Ingress Tool Transfer

    Logs

    • Sysmon Event ID 1 and 3 · PowerShell decoding a URL-safe Base64 string to write a batch launcher, then retrieving a decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev with the device MachineGuid as a request parameter and extracting %TEMP%\SCKitBundle
  4. RelayTrap persistence and local compilation

    • T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
    • T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
    • T1562.001

    Logs

    • Sysmon Event ID 11 and 13, Security Event ID 4698 · Scripts written under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, the machine-wide RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value, a scheduled task starting a watcher with -PollSeconds 10, csc.exe compiling RelayTrap.exe from RelayTrap.cs, and Microsoft Defender exclusion registry writes for staged MSI files
  5. Guest-to-host launcher push to technicians via CVE-2026-84869

    • T1203Exploitation for Client Execution

    Logs

    • ScreenConnect Session.db · RelayTrap reusing the endpoint's ScreenConnect connection details to push its batch launcher to a technician host client, blocked in client version 26.6.5 and later
  6. Browser session cookie theft

    • T1539Steal Web Session Cookie
    • T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

    Logs

    • Sysmon Event ID 1 and 11 · sqlite3.exe querying Chrome, Edge, Opera and Opera GX cookie databases for .ASPXAUTH cookies, cookie database copies with volume-shadow-copy fallbacks, and DPAPI plus AES-GCM decryption of v10 and v11 cookie values
  7. Shared Toolbox payload distribution with stolen console sessions

    Logs

    • ScreenConnect console audit logs · ToolboxRelayUploader.exe combining a stolen authentication cookie with anti-forgery and access tokens, enumerating accessible sessions, uploading a payload through the Shared Toolbox, queuing execution and removing the uploaded item

Indicators of compromise

IPs (2)

  • 185.99.255.28Unauthorized ScreenConnect server and installer source
  • 155.94.150.39Address associated with the unauthorized panel

Domains (5)

  • ns.mo7sen.devDecoder, bundle, script and utility retrieval infrastructure
  • sc.payproofkit.comUnauthorized ScreenConnect panel and installer source
  • cdn007-digitaldownloads.comCampaign infrastructure and configured installer source
  • newnewnew.gotdns.orgAssociated ScreenConnect relay
  • soxnewwork.homedns.orgAssociated ScreenConnect relay

Hashes (18)

  • 61a672a13f03a9e81f573535ee92b1ed6cb7e848a33a06048865312d4e185ae2SHA-256, sc.msi rogue client installer (rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091 observed)
  • 8e6912deed82e80bb6bd66f73509d024b1f78b993515366d8317e69a97cff4f4SHA-256, staged SCKit toolkit ZIP
  • 8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06afSHA-256, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe
  • 94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11SHA-256, Panel-Lateral-free.ps1
  • 7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ecSHA-256, Panel-Lateral.ps1
  • b93f10f30ee453d1e1c046fec9d141c41d7680be5cd46c3aeb3febe0f4953b4dSHA-256, LabConfig.ps1 helper
  • 3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4SHA-256, RelayTrap.cs source
  • d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9aSHA-256, TrapWatch.ps1 watcher script
  • 4a1dd3cd2ea14368afadf7e9dfdd63b104e3981ef8c85bbb6510919b810af04bSHA-256, trapkit install.ps1
  • cf50d73fa8117a758093b1344de41cd6a6ccddc645cdda1fa91a9264efe93956SHA-256, Lite-Alert.ps1 alert script
  • 81cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f781SHA-256, Stage0Loader.ps1
  • 43b7a5e56f9e6c7b74e1ce2b7b5af63f383084625fcc2d3a5985fa1059e2db95SHA-256, Run-Lateral-Full.bat
  • 50659748723e906c8b3d3c0386bd4cf692f693a3e23639398c1a14d0c31fed61SHA-256, runnew.cmd
  • 5dd3a6ba806ac472663e243cfc1c034c534d5d9a42ec362c3dbf0f8d950148d0SHA-256, Stop-LabTrap.bat cleanup launcher
  • 454c43d296b1276bde9a4f6ff1da2221cb35ccdb2fc7991bdd572e45bce12a8aSHA-256, TRAP-PROOF.bat proof artifact
  • 0be01e7bd69cfdd222645d49bb5ad9961372fef2SHA-1, sc.msi installer package
  • 3f81c9c874a896c46e4bccea2fad2eaa3d9f2054SHA-1, staged toolkit ZIP
  • 13ce33b19daee3963f7e15d461b191c38f6bc0d3SHA-1, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe

CVEs (1)

  • CVE-2026-84869ScreenConnect guest file-push flaw used by RelayTrap for endpoint-to-technician spread; blocked in client 26.6.5 and later, and no successful spread observed in testing

Sources

Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).

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