SCKit ScreenConnect rogue client worm
SCKit worm turns hijacked ScreenConnect panels against MSP technicians
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Unattributed attackers seized cloud-hosted ScreenConnect management instances at managed service providers from November 11 and used the console's Run Command to push rogue ScreenConnect clients and the worm-like SCKit toolkit onto managed endpoints, hitting 288 endpoints across 48 organizations in the first wave, Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Blackpoint Cyber report. On each endpoint the client service ran cmd.exe, using curl to fetch and silently install a rogue ScreenConnect client connecting to the attacker's relay; a decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev keyed to the MachineGuid extracted the SCKit bundle. RelayTrap persisted via the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run key and a watcher task polling every 10 seconds, compiled against the endpoint's ScreenConnect libraries, and wrote Defender exclusions. When a technician with a client older than 26.6.5 connected, RelayTrap tried to push its launcher via CVE-2026-84869; no technician compromise was observed in testing. A browser component stole .ASPXAUTH cookies from Chrome, Edge and Opera, and ToolboxRelayUploader used stolen console sessions to push payloads through the Shared Toolbox. Clients must be updated to 26.6.5.9742 or later.
Breakdown
Targets
- Industry: Managed service providers
Technical exposure
- RMM+ extension 1.0.31 or 1.0.32 configured without an access key
- ScreenConnect technician host clients older than 26.6.5
- Endpoints trusting the MSP ScreenConnect console for command execution
Adversary
Unattributed threat actor; initial access route under investigation, RMM+ extension empty-key authentication suspected
Procedures (7)
Rogue ScreenConnect client installation
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 1 and 3 · cmd.exe and curl.exe children of the ScreenConnect endpoint client downloading ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi with an Exploited marker, saved as C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi and installed silently, then connecting to attacker relays such as sc[.]payproofkit[.]com or 185[.]99[.]255[.]28
SCKit decoder staging keyed to MachineGuid
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 1 and 3 · PowerShell decoding a URL-safe Base64 string to write a batch launcher, then retrieving a decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev with the device MachineGuid as a request parameter and extracting %TEMP%\SCKitBundle
RelayTrap persistence and local compilation
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 11 and 13, Security Event ID 4698 · Scripts written under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, the machine-wide RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value, a scheduled task starting a watcher with -PollSeconds 10, csc.exe compiling RelayTrap.exe from RelayTrap.cs, and Microsoft Defender exclusion registry writes for staged MSI files
Guest-to-host launcher push to technicians via CVE-2026-84869
- T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
Logs
- ScreenConnect Session.db · RelayTrap reusing the endpoint's ScreenConnect connection details to push its batch launcher to a technician host client, blocked in client version 26.6.5 and later
Browser session cookie theft
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 1 and 11 · sqlite3.exe querying Chrome, Edge, Opera and Opera GX cookie databases for .ASPXAUTH cookies, cookie database copies with volume-shadow-copy fallbacks, and DPAPI plus AES-GCM decryption of v10 and v11 cookie values
Shared Toolbox payload distribution with stolen console sessions
- T1078Valid Accounts
Logs
- ScreenConnect console audit logs · ToolboxRelayUploader.exe combining a stolen authentication cookie with anti-forgery and access tokens, enumerating accessible sessions, uploading a payload through the Shared Toolbox, queuing execution and removing the uploaded item
Indicators of compromise
IPs (2)
- 185.99.255.28Unauthorized ScreenConnect server and installer source
- 155.94.150.39Address associated with the unauthorized panel
Domains (5)
- ns.mo7sen.devDecoder, bundle, script and utility retrieval infrastructure
- sc.payproofkit.comUnauthorized ScreenConnect panel and installer source
- cdn007-digitaldownloads.comCampaign infrastructure and configured installer source
- newnewnew.gotdns.orgAssociated ScreenConnect relay
- soxnewwork.homedns.orgAssociated ScreenConnect relay
Hashes (18)
- 61a672a13f03a9e81f573535ee92b1ed6cb7e848a33a06048865312d4e185ae2SHA-256, sc.msi rogue client installer (rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091 observed)
- 8e6912deed82e80bb6bd66f73509d024b1f78b993515366d8317e69a97cff4f4SHA-256, staged SCKit toolkit ZIP
- 8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06afSHA-256, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe
- 94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11SHA-256, Panel-Lateral-free.ps1
- 7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ecSHA-256, Panel-Lateral.ps1
- b93f10f30ee453d1e1c046fec9d141c41d7680be5cd46c3aeb3febe0f4953b4dSHA-256, LabConfig.ps1 helper
- 3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4SHA-256, RelayTrap.cs source
- d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9aSHA-256, TrapWatch.ps1 watcher script
- 4a1dd3cd2ea14368afadf7e9dfdd63b104e3981ef8c85bbb6510919b810af04bSHA-256, trapkit install.ps1
- cf50d73fa8117a758093b1344de41cd6a6ccddc645cdda1fa91a9264efe93956SHA-256, Lite-Alert.ps1 alert script
- 81cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f781SHA-256, Stage0Loader.ps1
- 43b7a5e56f9e6c7b74e1ce2b7b5af63f383084625fcc2d3a5985fa1059e2db95SHA-256, Run-Lateral-Full.bat
- 50659748723e906c8b3d3c0386bd4cf692f693a3e23639398c1a14d0c31fed61SHA-256, runnew.cmd
- 5dd3a6ba806ac472663e243cfc1c034c534d5d9a42ec362c3dbf0f8d950148d0SHA-256, Stop-LabTrap.bat cleanup launcher
- 454c43d296b1276bde9a4f6ff1da2221cb35ccdb2fc7991bdd572e45bce12a8aSHA-256, TRAP-PROOF.bat proof artifact
- 0be01e7bd69cfdd222645d49bb5ad9961372fef2SHA-1, sc.msi installer package
- 3f81c9c874a896c46e4bccea2fad2eaa3d9f2054SHA-1, staged toolkit ZIP
- 13ce33b19daee3963f7e15d461b191c38f6bc0d3SHA-1, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe
CVEs (1)
- CVE-2026-84869ScreenConnect guest file-push flaw used by RelayTrap for endpoint-to-technician spread; blocked in client 26.6.5 and later, and no successful spread observed in testing
Sources
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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