ScreenConnect crypto bait sessions
Fake Crypto-Exchange Guest Sessions Enrolled on 100+ ScreenConnect Servers as Technician Bait
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Unattributed operators of a scripted ScreenConnect guest-client emulator enrolled 2,408 unauthorized always-online sessions on at least 118 self-hosted servers across 109 organizations between November 3 and 13, 2026; Huntress assesses the crypto-exchange-named machines are bait for technicians (grade B/2). The emulator impersonates a Windows guest client using relay addresses from publicly downloadable guest installers, reuses seven trading-desktop preview images across more than 1,000 names, and reconnects roughly every 55 minutes to appear permanently online. Huntress saw no file pushes, commands, or guest-side activity, though one technician used send-text in a fake session, which ScreenConnect does not retain and was treated as possible credential exposure. The leading hypothesis is that a technician with a client older than 26.6.5 joining a fake session could be exploited via CVE-2026-84869; no overlap with SCKit indicators was found. Hunt the App_Data session database for new Access guests with an empty guest public key, ClientType 1, version 25.3.4.9288, and exchange-plus-role names; review server logs for enrollment bursts from 74.208.158.106.
Breakdown
Countries
- Germany
- Egypt
Targets
- Industry: Opportunistic
Technical exposure
- Unauthenticated ScreenConnect guest installer downloads expose relay addresses
- Emulator sessions show empty guest public key, ClientType 1, version 25.3.4.9288
- Always-online unfamiliar Access sessions can bait technicians into connecting
- Unpatched technician clients remain exposed to CVE-2026-84869 on join
Adversary
Unattributed scripted-emulator operator; 97.8 percent of connections from IONOS host 74.208.158.106, first sessions from Egyptian residential IP 197.47.160.252
Procedures (2)
Enroll unauthorized guest sessions via scripted client emulator
- T1036Masquerading
Logs
- ScreenConnect session database (App_Data Session.db) · New Access guest sessions with empty guest public key, ClientType 1, claimed version 25.3.4.9288, and exchange-plus-role names
- SIEM ScreenConnect server logs · Bursts of guest session creations or reconnections from a single external IP, notably 74.208.158.106
Maintain fake sessions as persistent technician bait
Logs
- ScreenConnect session history · Technician joins to crypto-named sessions, send-text usage, and sessions reconnecting roughly every 55 minutes
Indicators of compromise
IPs (3)
- 74.208.158.106IONOS VPS; source of 97.8 percent of crypto-named guest connections November 3-13, 2026
- 197.47.160.252Egyptian residential IP; created the first three unauthorized sessions on November 3, 2026
- 87.106.111.220Related IONOS host with same JARM and TLS certificate; no guest sessions observed from it
Hashes (7)
- 008839ef2a2d54e9efa47013bb23c773d3a152f351e9dfd3b2f4dd27086121dfWebP bait preview thumbnail, Binance-style page; most-used image
- 45136a9ab47015c4334b881df9daf824a72347daae0b5730ce3bd7d42b204bf2WebP bait preview thumbnail, image family 2
- e73020645e7a11a90865d93bd7f3d797585f49ef72b1ac7354392a2da7fbd91fWebP bait preview thumbnail, image family 3
- c15b008b0296b1bc9e0f979e6f25b780e3e89edabb344c7ee8c284a1a140f0d7WebP bait preview thumbnail, image family 4
- b55ce5130cd2623017cca29318341f6b4656e3a1dc5ab82ce704e912d0d17535WebP bait preview thumbnail, image family 5
- bea82efc82672225cf29eb869972670754f15941bc61b9e5801ffd41c5c39e5fWebP bait preview thumbnail, image family 6
- f6d37291c4948b974caf2e9e7e8ca9c2173d2779d1ec0a391488706bbd1a995cWebP bait preview thumbnail, image family 7
CVEs (1)
- CVE-2026-84869Hypothesized impact path if a technician with client older than 26.6.5 joins a fake session; not observed exploited in this campaign
Sources
- B/2Huntress
- B/3IT Security Guru
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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