ScreenConnect technician file-push campaign
ScreenConnect guest file-push exploits CVE-2026-84869 against MSP technicians
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Unattributed attackers sprayed over 688,000 unauthorized guest file-run requests at 42 managed service provider ScreenConnect servers from 29 IP addresses since October 20, exploiting CVE-2026-84869 to run batch files on technician workstations the moment a technician joined, Huntress reports. The flaw, fixed in host client 26.6.5, lets a session guest push a file the technician's client runs without a prompt; updating only the server leaves technicians exposed. In the confirmed November 12 compromise the technician's client ran update_224ac089.bat and within nine seconds relaunched itself hidden via PowerShell, reported the victim over a Telegram bot, downloaded WindowsUpdate.msi from masterdarky[.]com, unpacked it with msiexec, launched the payload with runas, and started a rebranded ScreenConnect client, WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe, connecting to the attacker's relay on port 8041. A marker.txt canary tested whether exploitation works, and October guests pushed a path-traversal filename to drop Sync.bat into technicians' Startup folders. Huntress links the spray and relay operators with high confidence; the campaign is distinct from the SCKit and crypto-bait campaigns.
Breakdown
Targets
- Industry: Managed service providers
Technical exposure
- ScreenConnect host clients older than 26.6.5 on technician machines
- Guest sessions granted the TransferFiles permission
- MSP ScreenConnect servers reachable by arbitrary guest sessions
Adversary
Unattributed operator; Huntress links the file-push spray and the masterdarky[.]com relay operator with high confidence
Procedures (6)
Guest file-push exploitation of CVE-2026-84869
- T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
Logs
- ScreenConnect Session.db · RanFiles (EventType 85) or SentFiles (EventType 86) events from a guest connection (ProcessType 2), especially repeated update.bat or update_<8 hex>.bat requests in blank-named sessions
Hidden batch relaunch and Telegram check-in
- T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 1 · ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe or a branded ScreenConnect client spawning cmd.exe, powershell.exe or wscript.exe with a command line referencing the ScreenConnect Temp folder and RunFile
Web proxy logs · Base64-encoded Telegram bot token and chat ID decoded by a batch script, followed by an outbound request to api.telegram.org
Stage-two MSI download and administrative unpack
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 1 and 3 · curl started by a ScreenConnect host client downloading an .msi from masterdarky[.]com, then msiexec.exe with /a and TARGETDIR pointing into %LOCALAPPDATA%\wclient_<8 hex>
Trust-level launch with seclogon reconfiguration
- T1202Indirect Command Execution
- T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 1 · runas.exe with /trustlevel:0x20000 and csc.exe compiling PowerShell Add-Type code, spawned by the downloaded script
Windows Security Event ID 7045 · The seclogon service being reconfigured for automatic startup and started during the compromise window
Rogue ScreenConnect client to attacker relay
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 3 and firewall logs · WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe or any ScreenConnect client whose command line points to a relay the organization does not own, connecting to masterdarky[.]com on port 8041
Startup-folder persistence via guest path traversal
- T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Logs
- ScreenConnect Session.db · Guest-originated RanFiles events whose filename contains ../ or a Windows Startup folder path such as Sync.bat
File creation monitoring · Unexpected files written to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\, especially Sync.bat
Indicators of compromise
IPs (33)
- 194.15.36.33Resolution of masterdarky[.]com, the attacker relay and payload host
- 91.224.92.167Hand-operated guest that pushed the marker.txt canary
- 91.224.92.83Pushed Run-Lateral.bat seven times at a technician
- 193.26.115.63Pushed the Startup-folder Sync.bat path traversal
- 57.128.131.66Pushed the Startup-folder Sync.bat path traversal
- 107.148.223.37Pushed svc_payload.cmd 207 times
- 162.35.40.249Sprayer IP
- 64.20.44.120Sprayer IP
- 103.195.102.66Sprayer IP
- 103.195.102.76Sprayer IP
- 103.195.100.70Sprayer IP
- 103.195.100.69Sprayer IP
- 199.127.60.150Sprayer IP
- 199.127.60.149Sprayer IP
- 199.127.62.58Sprayer IP
- 181.215.242.106Sprayer IP
- 162.35.167.105Sprayer IP
- 23.92.65.131Sprayer IP
- 23.94.77.110Sprayer IP
- 198.23.165.181Sprayer IP
- 107.173.186.58Sprayer IP
- 50.114.203.14Sprayer IP
- 38.18.228.165Sprayer IP
- 38.18.228.173Sprayer IP
- 38.18.229.249Sprayer IP
- 66.118.239.23Sprayer IP
- 74.235.98.176Sprayer IP
- 172.81.61.149Sprayer IP
- 178.173.246.85Sprayer IP
- 154.30.4.248Sprayer IP
Show all 33Show fewer
- 107.148.223.103Sprayer IP
- 98.142.247.243Sprayer IP
- 45.13.233.32Sprayer IP
Domains (1)
- masterdarky.comAttacker ScreenConnect relay on port 8041 and stage-two payload host
URLs (1)
- https://masterdarky.com/WindowsUpdate.msiStage-two installer containing the rebranded rogue ScreenConnect client
Hashes (1)
- f8871b1561d5c77c297378a7f49c84de52a01ff297395544f0e95d13ef972841SHA-256 of WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe, the rogue ScreenConnect client connecting to masterdarky[.]com on port 8041
CVEs (1)
- CVE-2026-84869ScreenConnect client missing-authorization flaw (CVSS 9.9) letting a guest push and run files on a technician machine without confirmation; fixed in host client 26.6.5
Sources
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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