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ShadowCloud GitHub and SharePoint C2 backdoors

Operation ShadowCloud: unattributed espionage campaign hides GitDoor and GraphDoor backdoor C2 in GitHub, SharePoint and Ably

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

An espionage campaign that Kaspersky GReAT tracks as Operation ShadowCloud and does not attribute (A/1) abuses the MeshCentral agent to drop two new backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor, that hide command-and-control inside GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint and Ably traffic at government organizations across Asia and Africa. Kaspersky published the two-part Securelist analysis on 17 November 2026 and says it identified the active campaign in early 2026, with victims in Asia and Africa, primarily in the government sector. The backdoors enumerate processes, log keystrokes, capture screenshots, steal browser cookies and credentials, extract WhatsApp database decryption keys and tunnel SOCKS5 proxy traffic over Ably, so espionage traffic blends with ordinary cloud use. The material uncertainty is attribution: Kaspersky reports staging overlaps with the Chinese-speaking groups FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle but says this does not prove a direct link. No CVE applies; initial access is unknown and the report says evidence points to reuse of a prior infection already present on victim networks.

Breakdown

Countries

  • Southeast Asia
  • Africa
  • Central Asia
  • Taiwan

Targets

  • Industry: Government

Technical exposure

  • Windows host running the MeshCentral agent (MeshAgent) reaching C2 over port 443
  • Signed or trusted executables present that can sideload attacker loader DLLs
  • Outbound HTTPS to api.github.com, rest.ably.io and Microsoft 365 endpoints
  • Entra ID tenant permitting app-only client-credential token issuance
  • SharePoint Online site reachable from non-browser processes via Microsoft Graph

Adversary

Unattributed · Kaspersky GReAT (A/1) reports overlaps with the Chinese-speaking groups FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle but stops short of attribution

Procedures (8)

  1. MeshCentral agent instances run on victim workstations

    Logs

    • EDR process events · Process created: MeshCentral agent / MeshAgent.exe; sample MD5 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b; paired with outbound TLS
    • NGFW/proxy TLS events · TLS to wss://27.102.66.162:443/agent.ashx (raw IP, no SNI domain); MeshAgent C2
  2. Trusted executables sideload loader DLLs that decrypt and inject the backdoor

    • T1574.002
    • T1620Reflective Code Loading
    • T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

    Logs

    • Sysmon/EDR process and file events · start.exe, javaw.exe, pythonw.exe, dtsapo4service.exe or zoomit.exe (run as a service) with loader DLLs jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, SbieDll_st.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll, libcef.dll and a config.ini drop in the same directory; type 1 loader MD5 32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3, type 2 loader MD5 e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3
  3. GitDoor opens a GitHub issue per victim and exfiltrates encrypted host data

    • T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
    • T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

    Logs

    • NGFW/proxy HTTP events · HTTPS to api.github.com with a decrypted personal access token, an issue titled 'problem <GUID>' body 'code <8-char victim code>' in repos under accounts such as LatonyCharnleyaW (Trix upload, Havo download), files named main.<8-char code>.js.map, commit message 'commit from INSOMNIA', random X-CSRF-TOKEN per request
  4. Backdoor tunnels data and SOCKS5 proxy traffic through Ably channels

    Logs

    • NGFW/proxy HTTP events · HTTPS to rest.ably.io posting victim data to channel 'data:main.<victim code>.js.map' (message 'part-1') and polling /channels/comm/messages?limit=50; wss://main.pusher.ably.net/app/<APP_KEY>?protocol=7&client=cpp-socks5 with private-socks5-<id>-request/response channels for the SOCKS5 proxy
  5. GraphDoor requests an Entra ID app-only token with hard-coded client credentials

    • T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token

    Logs

    • Entra ID sign-in logs · Service principal (app-only) sign-in: client credentials grant POST to /8f50c589-a4d6-4df4-95bb-2fb7f5983fe5/oauth2/v2.0/token with scope https://graph.microsoft.com/.default from a workstation; no interactive user
    • NGFW/proxy TLS events · TLS to login.microsoftonline.com and graph.microsoft.com from non-browser processes on endpoints
  6. GraphDoor stores victim data and receives commands in a SharePoint site

    • T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
    • T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

    Logs

    • SharePoint Online audit logs · Graph API uploads of main.<8-char victim code>.js.map to the drive root of buildersemp.sharepoint.com (commit message 'commit from INSOMNIA') and list queries for plug-ins scr.ts, pr.ts, kl.ts and command files with .js/.swp/.tmp/.kmap/.pmap/.apmap extensions
  7. Plug-ins steal credentials, browser cookies and WhatsApp decryption keys

    Logs

    • EDR process events · In-memory Mimikatz variant 'imzimzgo 2.2.0 x64' (sekurlsa::logonpasswords, lsadump::sam), CookieKatz dumping cookies from chrome.exe/msedge.exe process memory, keylogger writing %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat and checking %APPDATA%\log.lock, WhatsApp key module with PDB WhatKeyCPP.pdb
  8. Shellcode modules manage services, tasks, registry, shells and proxies

    • T1569.002System Services: Service Execution
    • T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
    • T1112Modify Registry

    Logs

    • Sysmon/EDR process and file events · cmd.exe /C command execution and WinPTY reverse shell (named pipe \\.\pipe\MyInputPipe), service/task/registry enumeration and creation via the backdoor, Erfrp-derived Go proxy client (MD5 d89b2fe0759df2d534e7a728700a6f8c), moveDir.ts relocating the infection files, uploads to upload.gofile.io

Indicators of compromise

IPs (6)

  • 27.102.66.162MeshCentral agent C2 (wss agent.ashx); hunt-only
  • 103.106.230.33Proxy C2 resolving ms.twnic.top; hunt-only
  • 123.58.205.105Proxy C2 resolving ekmt.tw; hunt-only
  • 104.194.154.28Proxy C2 server; hunt-only
  • 223.165.4.203Proxy C2 server; hunt-only
  • 43.134.62.111Proxy C2 server (Tencent ASN); hunt-only

Domains (7)

  • buildersemp.sharepoint.comGraphDoor SharePoint C2 site for victim data and commands
  • cskautogo.sharepoint.comSharePoint site indicator; hunt-only
  • ms.twnic.topCobalt Strike beacon C2 domain; hunt-only
  • ekmt.twCobalt Strike beacon C2 domain; hunt-only
  • rest.ably.ioAbly REST endpoint abused for data channel; legitimate service
  • main.pusher.ably.netAbly WebSocket endpoint for SOCKS5 proxy; legitimate service
  • upload.gofile.ioFile-upload destination of Fileupload shellcode; hunt-only

URLs (1)

  • wss://27.102.66.162:443/agent.ashxMeshCentral agent C2 URL; hunt-only

Hashes (6)

  • 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835bMD5; MeshCentral Agent
  • 552f0a9cc5fc3755721fa49be05e8035MD5; GitDoor backdoor
  • 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952MD5; GraphDoor backdoor
  • 32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3MD5; Type 1 loader jli.dll
  • e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3MD5; Type 2 loader SbieDll_st.dll
  • 6a54f8008ee659b6923abf5dba2b2cc1MD5; encrypted payload config.ini

Sources

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