SOMBERMEME Claude Code config backdoor
Suspected North Korea-linked MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE poisons Claude Code settings files to deliver SOMBERMEME backdoor at cryptocurrency firms
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
A suspected North Korea-linked cluster Google tracks as MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE used AI-generated recruiter personas and ClickFix lures to breach cryptocurrency organizations in North America and Europe, then modified .claude/settings.json files in internal code repositories so that starting Claude Code automatically downloaded the SOMBERMEME backdoor, per Google Threat Intelligence Group (A/2). The significant new report is the GTIG AI Threat Tracker published November 16, 2026, which describes multiple 2026 intrusions combining LLM-enabled social engineering with abuse of organizational AI tools as an internal supply chain vector. Recruiter personas on professional networking sites carried SynthID watermarks confirming AI generation, and fraudulent meeting platforms prompted targets to run diagnostic-fix scripts to stage access. After pivoting into internal code repositories, the actor also generated GitHub personal access tokens named after Microsoft Copilot to mask lateral movement; Google published no hashes, domains, or victim names, and assesses the North Korea link with low confidence.
Breakdown
Countries
- North America
- Europe
Targets
- Industry: Cryptocurrency
Technical exposure
- Claude Code projects with .claude/settings.json committed to shared repositories
- Developers reachable on professional networking platforms via recruiter personas
- Repository write access from a developer workstation after ClickFix execution
Adversary
MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE, suspected North Korea-linked cluster tracked by Google (A/2, low confidence)
Procedures (4)
AI-generated recruiter personas lure developers to fake meeting platforms
- T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link
Logs
- Web proxy egress log · Developer workstations following professional-network message links to newly registered fraudulent meeting-platform domains
ClickFix diagnostic-fix scripts stage access on developer workstations
Logs
PowerShell Script Block Logging · Script blocks invoking web download cmdlets from pasted diagnostic-fix instructions tied to a meeting-platform lure
Sysmon Event ID 1 process creation · Terminal or PowerShell processes launched immediately after a fraudulent meeting-platform error page prompted a pasted fix
Modified .claude/settings.json makes Claude Code startup download SOMBERMEME
Logs
GitHub audit log · Commits adding SessionStart hooks to .claude/settings.json in internal repositories from accounts outside the normal maintainer setSysmon Event ID 1 process creation · claude or its node host process spawning download primitives such as curl, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil or bitsadmin at Claude Code session start
Detectors
- MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE Claude Code config backdoor delivery · Process-creation events where claude (or node running claude) is the parent and the child command line contains download primitives (URL, DownloadString, DownloadFile, Invoke-WebRequest, certutil urlcache, bitsadmin)Not built-in
GitHub tokens named after Microsoft Copilot mask lateral movement
- T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Logs
GitHub audit log · Personal access token creation events naming Microsoft Copilot by accounts with recent anomalous commit or settings-file changes
Sources
- A/2Google Threat Intelligence Group: GTIG AI Threat Tracker - Agentic Threat Activity Crosses a Significant Threshold
- B/3SecurityAffairs: Google GTIG warns AI agents automate exploits, steal credentials and scale cybercrime
- C/3Threadlinqs: GTIG warns fully-automated agentic AI attacks imminent (TL-2026-6152)
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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