Tailworm — unpatched Tailscale SSH root-escalation and tailnet-escape findings
Posted · Updated · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
Erica Windisch (Cyberdione Labs) published 11 lab-reproduced findings in Tailscale v1.104.2 and headscale v0.29.5 on Oct 24-25, 2026, without coordinated disclosure. With Tailscale SSH enabled, root-privileged tailscaled dials root-only Unix sockets on behalf of an approved peer, so an accepted SSH rule with forwarding becomes root on the target and capture of node enrollment keys. No CVE, fix, or vendor bulletin yet; no in-the-wild exploitation reported.
Breakdown
Adversary
Unknown
Procedures (6)
Tailscale SSH local Unix-socket forwarding to root-only sockets
- T1021.004Remote Services: SSH
Logs
Linux auditd object-scoped socket watches; tailscaled ssh-conn session lines
Click to expand remaining (5) proceduresHide remaining procedures
Remote-forward BindUnlink replaces root-owned sockets
- T1021.004Remote Services: SSH
- T1611Escape to Host
Logs
Linux auditd unlink/bind watches on /run, /tmp, homes
TOCTOU rename race defeats SSH path allowlist
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Logs
auditd rename/bind/chmod watches; rename-storm rate alerting ~1e5/s; 0755 socket where 0600 expected
Rogue node enrollment with captured authkey
- T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration
Logs
Tailscale admin console audit log/API: node joins, authkey issuance/use
conn25 app connector destination bypass
- T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API
Logs
K8s API server audit logs (connector-sourced requests); connector host egress logs
serve --tcp forward to localapi socket (node takeover)
- T1562.001
Logs
tailscaled serve config changes; localapi access
Sources
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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