tcherber VPN access brokerage
tcherber operation brokers FortiGate VPN access with automated Go toolkit and MaaS offerings
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
An unattributed Russian-speaking operator tracked as tcherber runs an initial-access-brokerage and malware-as-a-service operation (B/2, Cyderes Howler Cell) that assembled over 500 validated FortiGate VPN credentials and used an automated Go toolkit to establish root-level tunnels into victim organizations, selling VPN access and custom malware underground. A fake Windows Update installer delivering a Rust-based loader, stealer and HVNC components exposed the /home/tcherber/ build path, pivoting to a Go toolkit whose orchestrator launches OpenConnect FortiGate tunnels, parses internal routes, enumerates Active Directory via LDAP and scans SMB shares. A recovered credential database mixes default passwords (guest:guest, admin:admin) with organization-specific ones, indicating brute-force harvesting plus credential-dump sourcing, and VPN logs confirm multi-hour root-level tunnels during May and June 2026. Darkweb posts on rehubcom.pro advertise FortiGate, Cisco and Citrix access plus custom C2, loader and crypting services, and a standalone C2 panel held 178 active bots built in September 2026.
Breakdown
Technical exposure
- Internet-facing FortiGate SSL VPN portals
- SonicWall NetExtender VPN gateways
- VPN accounts using default or reused credentials
- Windows hosts running fake update installers
Adversary
tcherber (Russian-speaking operator) · Cyderes Howler Cell (B/2)
Procedures (3)
Fake Windows Update installer delivers Rust loader, stealer and HVNC
Logs
Endpoint process telemetry · Windows Update-branded installer spawning a Rust-based loader, followed by information-stealer and HVNC components; stolen data packaged into ZIP archives and uploaded via the Telegram sendDocument API or reported to Zer0day Framework infrastructureWindows process telemetry · Rust binaries whose panic strings expose the /home/tcherber/ build path, linking loader samples to the operator's wider Rust and Go tooling including Enigma ransomware artifacts
Automated Go toolkit validates FortiGate and SonicWall credentials, tunnels in
- T1110Brute Force
- T1078Valid Accounts
Logs
FortiGate SSL VPN authentication logs · Successful logins for guest, admin or test accounts or organization-specific passwords from unfamiliar source IPs; multi-hour sustained sessions establishing root-level tunnels; logins via OpenConnect with the fortinet protocol showing 30-second reconnect loops
- SonicWall VPN gateway logs · NetExtender connections whose client probed seven login-page paths to auto-discover the VPN authentication domain before authenticating with validated credentials
Post-tunnel LDAP, SMB and network reconnaissance feeds brokered access
- T1018Remote System Discovery
- T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account
Logs
Domain controller and LDAP logs · LDAP enumeration of users, groups, domain structure and domain controllers originating from VPN entry-point IPs shortly after successful SSL-VPN authentication
Windows file share audit logs · SMB share and host enumeration across internal subnets and credential validation attempts against Windows hosts, matching a CrackMapExec-style workflow, from the same VPN entry point
Indicators of compromise
Domains (1)
- rehubcom.prodarkweb marketplace where the operator advertises VPN access and malware services
Sources
- B/2Cyderes Howler Cell: Exposing tcherber - VPN Access Brokerage, Custom Malware, and an Exposed C2 Panel
- C/3Mallory Intelligence: Researchers Link tcherber to FortiGate VPN Access Sales and Custom Malware Operation
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
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