Threat feed

tcherber VPN access brokerage

tcherber operation brokers FortiGate VPN access with automated Go toolkit and MaaS offerings

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

An unattributed Russian-speaking operator tracked as tcherber runs an initial-access-brokerage and malware-as-a-service operation (B/2, Cyderes Howler Cell) that assembled over 500 validated FortiGate VPN credentials and used an automated Go toolkit to establish root-level tunnels into victim organizations, selling VPN access and custom malware underground. A fake Windows Update installer delivering a Rust-based loader, stealer and HVNC components exposed the /home/tcherber/ build path, pivoting to a Go toolkit whose orchestrator launches OpenConnect FortiGate tunnels, parses internal routes, enumerates Active Directory via LDAP and scans SMB shares. A recovered credential database mixes default passwords (guest:guest, admin:admin) with organization-specific ones, indicating brute-force harvesting plus credential-dump sourcing, and VPN logs confirm multi-hour root-level tunnels during May and June 2026. Darkweb posts on rehubcom.pro advertise FortiGate, Cisco and Citrix access plus custom C2, loader and crypting services, and a standalone C2 panel held 178 active bots built in September 2026.

Breakdown

Technical exposure

  • Internet-facing FortiGate SSL VPN portals
  • SonicWall NetExtender VPN gateways
  • VPN accounts using default or reused credentials
  • Windows hosts running fake update installers

Adversary

tcherber (Russian-speaking operator) · Cyderes Howler Cell (B/2)

Procedures (3)

  1. Fake Windows Update installer delivers Rust loader, stealer and HVNC

    Logs

    • Endpoint process telemetry · Windows Update-branded installer spawning a Rust-based loader, followed by information-stealer and HVNC components; stolen data packaged into ZIP archives and uploaded via the Telegram sendDocument API or reported to Zer0day Framework infrastructure
    • Windows process telemetry · Rust binaries whose panic strings expose the /home/tcherber/ build path, linking loader samples to the operator's wider Rust and Go tooling including Enigma ransomware artifacts
  2. Automated Go toolkit validates FortiGate and SonicWall credentials, tunnels in

    • T1110Brute Force
    • T1078Valid Accounts

    Logs

    • FortiGate SSL VPN authentication logs · Successful logins for guest, admin or test accounts or organization-specific passwords from unfamiliar source IPs; multi-hour sustained sessions establishing root-level tunnels; logins via OpenConnect with the fortinet protocol showing 30-second reconnect loops
    • SonicWall VPN gateway logs · NetExtender connections whose client probed seven login-page paths to auto-discover the VPN authentication domain before authenticating with validated credentials
  3. Post-tunnel LDAP, SMB and network reconnaissance feeds brokered access

    • T1018Remote System Discovery
    • T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account

    Logs

    • Domain controller and LDAP logs · LDAP enumeration of users, groups, domain structure and domain controllers originating from VPN entry-point IPs shortly after successful SSL-VPN authentication
    • Windows file share audit logs · SMB share and host enumeration across internal subnets and credential validation attempts against Windows hosts, matching a CrackMapExec-style workflow, from the same VPN entry point

Indicators of compromise

Domains (1)

  • rehubcom.prodarkweb marketplace where the operator advertises VPN access and malware services

Sources

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