Threat feed

Trigram fake-recruitment infostealer

Trigram campaign impersonates 50 AI and blockchain brands to plant infostealers on developers

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

A campaign tracked as Trigram impersonated about 50 blockchain and artificial-intelligence brands with fake job offers, conference invitations and package-tracking notices to trick developers into running an infostealer themselves, Stormshield reports (B/2). After a fake verification step, each decoy site intercepts the copy button so the clipboard receives a hidden command that downloads droppers named verify_w and verify_m; a GitLab dead-drop resolver rotates the command servers. The dropper installs portable Node.js and runs install_guard.js, which deploys an OverLord-based stealer that harvests browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets and sensitive files, plus agents that maintain access. A Django back office called rms-platform automates GitHub target collection, bulk email through four providers and real-time victim tracking through password theft, and the same operation compromised the antd-img-crop npm package, downloaded about 98,000 times a week. Stormshield assesses with high confidence that Trigram continues the North Korea-linked UNK_DeadDrop cluster, with overlaps to Kimsuky.

Breakdown

Countries

  • United States
  • Europe

Targets

  • Industry: Software developers
  • Industry: Blockchain and cryptocurrency
  • Industry: Artificial intelligence
  • Industry: Logistics

Technical exposure

  • Developer workstations with terminal access
  • Node.js installed or installable by the user
  • Developers receiving unsolicited job offers
  • npm packages installed without integrity checks

Adversary

Unattributed (Trigram) · Stormshield links to UNK_DeadDrop and Kimsuky, high confidence (B/2)

Procedures (5)

  1. Fake recruitment and tracking sites serve clipboard-swapped commands

    • T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link
    • T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

    Logs

    • Email gateway logs · Recruiter emails offering fully remote software positions with high salaries, linking to domains matching buildwith*, inv2*, join*, *hires, *council or *talents patterns on .xyz, .ink, .site and .space TLDs
    • Web proxy logs · POST requests to /track-activity, /refcode/unlock and /refcode/cmd-copy from decoy sites; terminal commands downloading verify_w or verify_m scripts after a fake nonce verification
  2. Droppers install the stealer through portable Node.js

    • T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
    • T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

    Logs

    • EDR process and file telemetry · Execution of install_guard.js under node, including a portable node-v20.18.1 download; PowerShell Unblock-File removing Zone.Identifier on Windows; artifacts named deepfake_guard, NVDG_LAUNCHER, /var/tmp/.kdm. and ~nvdg_worker.vbs; curl chains with --retry-all-errors

    Detectors

    • Stormshield YARA rule Dropper_DeepfakeGuard_NodeLoader_Generic · Matches bash and batch launchers with Base64 payloads loading a malicious JS file via Node.jsNot built-in
  3. Stealer harvests credentials, wallets and passwords

    • T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
    • T1056Input Capture

    Logs

    • EDR process telemetry · Access to browser credential stores and wallet files; fake system password prompts on macOS and Linux used to unlock stored secrets and install with elevated privileges; a browser extension named google-update-support used for persistence
  4. GitLab dead-drop resolver rotates command servers

    Logs

    • Web proxy logs · Fetches of config.json from GitLab repositories drop-indexings/tasks and up-indexings/tasks; subsequent connections to api.cerysoi.ink, api.chestsoi.ink, gamsterb.ink or api.gaganata.ink; telemetry posts to /guard-launcher-result and /guard-install-log with header X-Guard-Platform
  5. npm package and GitHub repository trojanized for delivery

    • T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

    Logs

    • CI and build logs · Build-time scripts in the antd-img-crop npm package downloading verify_m or verify_w from icagllmbt.space after the malicious commit of 31 October; .vscode/tasks.json in Foxtopia-NFT/foxtopia-frontend triggering scripts hidden in src/fonts/vendor on project open

Indicators of compromise

IPs (6)

  • 170.205.29.83operator back-office host, attributed by Proofpoint to UNK_DeadDrop
  • 170.205.30.27rms-platform Django service on port 8000, debug mode exposed
  • 193.160.32.10shared decoy infrastructure, ports 8080 and 8090 expose assets
  • 198.54.127.82sending infrastructure
  • 185.147.159.187console host
  • 146.19.215.187console host

Domains (8)

  • asteara.orgoperator dashboard, attributed by Proofpoint to UNK_DeadDrop
  • icagllmbt.spaceconference decoy and supply-chain distribution point for verify scripts
  • dashboard.gaganata.inkoperator dashboard and payload distribution
  • api.cerysoi.inkcommand server active from 4 November
  • api.chestsoi.inkcommand server documented by SafeDep on 31 October
  • gamsterb.inkcommand server receiving installation telemetry
  • buildwithritual.xyzrecruitment lure impersonating Ritual
  • loadshipdpd.inkpackage-tracking lure impersonating DPD

URLs (2)

  • https://api.gamsterb.ink/guard-launcher-resultdropper execution reporting endpoint
  • https://api.gamsterb.ink/guard-install-loginstallation log submission endpoint

Hashes (2)

  • cd20f43f985f7df7ba3ad9b08e5bdbecc20aaa4d8f60dc09e8468bdd1b249fe6SHA-256 Linux dropper (verify_m)
  • 249626244f23928c75e6c382da62278ed1d4e012a0c0f62beafefc1e4d7c5baaSHA-256 Windows dropper (verify_w)

Sources

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