UAT-12643 Overlord RAT Solana C2
Suspected North Korea-aligned UAT-12643 hides Overlord RAT command servers in Solana memos and survives a full Windows reset
Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team
Summary
A financially motivated cluster Cisco Talos tracks as UAT-12643, assessed with low confidence as North Korea-aligned (B/2), targeted Windows users in Europe with lure files installing the Overlord RAT, which hides its command servers in Solana blockchain memos and survives a full Windows reset. The significant new report is the Cisco Talos Threat Spotlight published November 18, 2026, built on an exposed staging server. Initial access runs through Windows shortcuts disguised as PDFs, HTA files executed by mshta.exe, MSBuild project files and trojanized Viber and MicroSIP installers aimed at finance staff, VoIP users, cryptocurrency holders and gamers. The RAT queries a Solana RPC node for the operator wallet's transactions, decrypts a 43-character memo into its WebSocket command address, marks itself a critical process so killing it blue-screens the host, and plants a batch launcher under the Recovery\OEM path that Windows Recovery Environment runs before the operating system is restored. Stolen data leaves through Discord webhooks and gofile.io; Talos published ClamAV signatures and Snort rules, while lure delivery and victim counts remain unknown.
Breakdown
Countries
- Europe
Targets
- Industry: Cryptocurrency and gaming users
- Industry: VoIP users
- Industry: Finance and accounting staff
Technical exposure
- Windows endpoints opening lure LNK, HTA or MSBuild files from unverified sources
- Users of Viber and MicroSIP softphone software targeted by trojanized installers
- Workstation egress to Solana RPC endpoints and gofile.io not blocked
Adversary
UAT-12643, financially motivated cluster assessed by Cisco Talos as North Korea-aligned with low confidence (B/2)
Procedures (6)
LNK, HTA and MSBuild lures execute downloader stages on Windows
- T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File
- T1218.005System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
- T1127.001Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 1 process creation · mshta.exe or msbuild.exe launched from shortcut files; HTA writing %TEMP%\s.exe via ADODB.Stream after MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP fetch; downloads with a spoofed Microsoft BITS User-Agent, or certutil -urlcache and MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile primitives
Detectors
- ClamAV UAT-12643 downloader signatures · Win.Downloader.LNKCertutil-10060623-0, Win.Trojan.LNKVideosExe-10060624-0, Html.Downloader.HTAStager-10060656-1, Xml.Downloader.MSBuildInline2-10060657-0
Good Game stealer harvests Discord tokens, browsers and wallets
- T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1005Data from Local System
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 1 process creation · PyInstaller-built binary named MsgEdgeUpdate.exe running from a user AppData folder, reading Discord LevelDB stores and Chromium browser profiles, then validating tokens against the Discord API
Detectors
- ClamAV Good Game stealer signatures · Win.Infostealer.GoodGame-10060617-0, Py.Infostealer.GoodGame-10060619-0, Py.Trojan.GoodGameLoader-10060620-0, Win.Infostealer.PyStealerDeps-10060618-0
Clipboard hijacker swaps copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses
- T1115Clipboard Data
Logs
- EDR process events · Clipper process hooking clipboard changes and replacing copied wallet addresses with an XOR-decrypted attacker address from its data section
Detectors
- ClamAV wallet clipper signature · Win.Trojan.WalletClipper-10060621-0
Overlord RAT resolves command servers from Solana transaction memos
- T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1573Encrypted Channel
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 3 network connections · Workstation process querying Solana RPC endpoints with getSignatures and getTransaction jsonParsed requests, then connecting to a decrypted WebSocket address; operator rotates the address by posting one memo transaction
Detectors
- Talos Snort rules for UAT-12643 · Snort2 SIDs 1:67490 and 1:67491; Snort3 SIDs 7:74 and 7:75Not built-in
Recovery OEM script persistence survives Reset this PC
- T1542Pre-OS Boot
Logs
Sysmon Event ID 11 file creation · Files created under the Recovery\OEM directory with random 20-character names and .bat wrappers calling cmd.exe /c start with %TARGETOSDRIVE%, plus unexpected changes to ResetConfig.xml
Stolen data leaves via Discord webhook and gofile.io
- T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Logs
- Web proxy egress log · Workstation POSTs to Discord webhook URLs with victim fingerprints and archive uploads to gofile.io following stealer execution
Indicators of compromise
IPs (1)
- 41.216.188.11staging server, exposed Flask file-delivery service on port 8000; hunt-only
Sources
- B/2Cisco Talos: UAT-12643 - Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing
- C/3Soctember: Talos says UAT-12643 hides command servers in Solana memos (retelling)
Grades are source reliability (A–F) and information credibility (1–6).
Questions, detections or sightings of UAT-12643 Overlord RAT Solana C2? Bring them to the community.