Threat feed

wfx-loot GitHub CI secret stealer

Unattributed actor used 4,837 stolen GitHub accounts to plant a CI secret stealer across more than 61,000 repositories

Posted · Spectrum Delta Research Team

Summary

An unattributed threat actor used stolen credentials for 4,837 GitHub accounts to plant a roughly 1,500-line secret-stealing shell script inside GitHub Actions workflows, shell scripts and npm installation hooks across 61,764 repositories, with the payload confirmed to have run in at least 1,835 of them, per Aikido Security, GitGuardian and Chainguard (A/2). The wfx-loot mass wave began on 10 November 2026: a probe pull request titled docs: dependency audit notes confirmed write access, then the payload landed as a workflow step, an npm postinstall hook or a throwaway workflow; GitHub held workflow-file payloads, so the actor shifted to npm hooks run during dependency installs. The script collects Actions secrets, the GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC tokens, cloud credential files, SSH and GPG keys, about 90 AI provider keys and runner memory, then exfiltrates over plain HTTP to four hard-coded addresses and Telegram. It mints OIDC tokens for cloud sessions and persists via new IAM access keys, opened trust policies and Azure federated credentials named wfx-ci-. No CVE or GitHub flaw was abused; the payload also reached Packagist package neuronai-studio 3.14.3 and Go module docker-env v1.0.278.

Breakdown

Targets

  • Industry: Opportunistic

Technical exposure

  • GitHub accounts with repository write access reachable by stolen tokens
  • GitHub Actions workflows with access to repository or organization secrets
  • npm, pnpm or yarn installs run without --ignore-scripts in affected repositories
  • Workflows or hooks able to mint OIDC tokens for cloud audiences

Adversary

Unattributed · Aikido Security, GitGuardian, Chainguard (A/2)

Procedures (5)

  1. Probe pull requests from hijacked accounts confirm write access

    Logs

    • GitHub audit and pull request events · Pull request titled docs: dependency audit notes opened from a wfx-docs branch adding docs/wfx-audit.md, opened by an account with no prior activity in the repository; 61,839 such requests were opened between 10 and 11 November 2026
  2. Secret-stealing script planted in workflows, shell scripts and npm hooks

    • T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell

    Logs

    • GitHub push and commit events · Commits titled ci: refresh build cache, chore: add ci helper or chore: add dependency audit workflow; a step named Restore cache added after a Pass runtime step; root-level .ci-[a-z0-9]{6}.sh plus a postinstall hook in package.json; new .github/workflows/build-audit-[a-z0-9]{6}.yml on a chore/[a-z0-9]{8} branch
  3. Runner memory and credential files harvested for secrets and AI keys

    • T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
    • T1005Data from Local System

    Logs

    • GitHub Actions job logs · Log line sh ./.ci-xxxxxx.sh during an npm install step; staging folder $RUNNER_TEMP/.wfx-<pid> and /tmp/wfx-scan-<pid>; steps exiting with status 42 when every exfiltration channel failed; variables WF_SECRETS, WF_CALLBACK, WF_TG_BOTS
    • EDR process and file events on developer machines · Local npm install running ./.ci-xxxxxx.sh between the hook commit and the cleanup commit; archive creation under .wfx- named folders
  4. OIDC tokens minted and exchanged for AWS, Azure and GCP sessions

    • T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token

    Logs

    • Cloud provider audit logs · STS AssumeRole with session name wfx-<pid> from a GitHub OIDC principal that was never configured; Vault JWT logins and Kubernetes secret reads presenting GitHub OIDC tokens; GCP generateAccessToken and signJwt calls on service accounts
    • Cloud provider audit logs · ARM token use and Azure CLI refresh-token replay against first-party Microsoft client IDs from a GitHub Actions runner
  5. Cloud persistence, forged status checks, then runs and logs deleted

    • T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
    • T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion

    Logs

    • AWS CloudTrail logs · iam:CreateAccessKey on up to two IAM users not created by the organization; role trust policies rewritten to Principal AWS *; sessions named wfx-*
    • Azure Active Directory audit logs · Federated identity credentials named wfx-ci- added to applications, pointing back to the compromised repository
    • GitHub audit log · Commit statuses with description wfx posted by an unexpected app; workflow runs deleted or missing run numbers around 10-12 November; revert commits ci: restore or ci: cleanup within a minute of the payload commit

Indicators of compromise

IPs (4)

  • 45.61.182.54v1 C2, ports 8080 and 8081, path /exfil; precursor wave 24-29 October
  • 18.143.168.96v2 C2, port 8080, path /exfil
  • 194.150.166.244v2 C2 from 11 November, port 8080, path /exfil
  • 153.75.82.159v3 C2, port 8080, path /exfil

URLs (4)

  • http://45.61.182.54:8080/exfilv1 exfiltration endpoint
  • http://18.143.168.96:8080/exfilv2 exfiltration endpoint
  • http://194.150.166.244:8080/exfilv2 exfiltration endpoint from 11 November
  • http://153.75.82.159:8080/exfilv3 exfiltration endpoint

Hashes (1)

  • 89695abb392d5cfd4972672961e644bb46baa98aa1ed7173c2a2816c762735cfSHA-256 of the wfx stealer shell script (Chainguard)

Sources

Questions, detections or sightings of wfx-loot GitHub CI secret stealer? Bring them to the community.